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THE ILLUSORY EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
JOHN F. STINNEFORD* 
Although there is no obvious doctrinal connection between the Supreme 
Court’s Miranda jurisprudence and its Eighth Amendment excessive 
punishments jurisprudence, the two are deeply connected at the level of 
methodology.  In both areas, the Supreme Court has been criticized for creating 
“prophylactic” rules that invalidate government actions because they create a 
mere risk of constitutional violation.  In reality, however, both sets of rules 
deny constitutional protection to a far greater number of individuals with 
plausible claims of unconstitutional treatment than they protect. 
This dysfunctional combination of over- and underprotection arises from the 
Supreme Court’s use of implementation rules as a substitute for constitutional 
interpretation.  A growing body of scholarship has shown that constitutional 
adjudication involves at least two distinct judicial activities:  interpretation 
and implementation.  Prophylactic rules are defensible as implementation tools 
that are necessary to reduce error costs in constitutional adjudication.  This 
Article contributes to implementation rules theory by showing that 
constitutional interpretation, defined as a receptive and non-instrumental 
effort to understand constitutional meaning, normally must precede 
constitutional implementation.  When the Supreme Court constructs 
implementation rules without first interpreting the Constitution, the rules 
appear arbitrary and overreaching because they do not have a demonstrable 
connection to constitutional meaning.  Such rules also narrow the scope of the 
Constitution itself, denying protection to any claimant who does not come 
within the rules.  The only way to remedy this dysfunction and provide 
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meaningful protection across a broad range of cases is to interpret the 
Constitution before implementing it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s current approach to the Eighth Amendment 
is often described as a paradigm of improper judicial legislation.1  
                                                          
 1. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2477 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (criticizing the Court for invalidating mandatory life sentences for 
juvenile offenders, on the ground that that “determining the appropriate sentence 
for a teenager convicted of murder presents grave and challenging questions of 
morality and social policy” and that the courts’ role “ is to apply the law, not to 
answer such questions”); Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword:  
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The Court has invalidated the sentencing practices of dozens of states 
and the federal government by declaring that imposition of the death 
penalty or life sentences with no possibility of parole for various 
classes of offense or offender is unconstitutional,2 while boldly 
proclaiming its own independence from the Eighth Amendment’s 
original meaning3 and even—increasingly—from current societal 
standards of decency.4  It is less often noted, however, that these 
decisions cover only a tiny subset of felony cases.  Outside this group, 
the Court takes precisely the opposite approach to claims of excessive 
punishment.  It not only refrains from judicial legislation, but has 
abandoned judicial review altogether.5  In such cases, the Court 
defers to the legislature not only as to whether a given punishment is 
excessive, but as to the definition of excessiveness itself.6 
The appearance of judicial activism has provoked inter-branch 
resentment and reaction, fueling our ongoing societal pathology of 
overcriminalization and overpunishment.7  The extreme deference 
                                                          
A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 90 (2005) (describing Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551 (2005), which invalidated the death penalty for juveniles, as “a naked 
political judgment”); Eric J. Segall, Reconceptualizing Judicial Activism as Judicial 
Responsibility:  A Tale of Two Justice Kennedys, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 709, 747 (2009) (“The 
problem with decisions like . . . Roper . . . is that they demonstrate that the Supreme 
Court quite often fails to act like a Court and instead behaves like some other kind of 
political institution.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460, 2474–75 (invalidating the sentencing 
practices of twenty-eight states and the federal government concerning mandatory 
life sentences for juvenile homicide offenders); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 
2023, 2034 (2010) (invalidating the sentencing practices of thirty-seven states, the 
District of Columbia, and the federal government concerning life sentences for 
juvenile non-homicide offenders); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 426, 447 
(invalidating the six state statutes authorizing the death penalty for non-homicide 
offenses against individuals), modified on denial of reh’g, 554 U.S. 945 (2008); Roper, 
543 U.S. at 564, 568 (invalidating the sentencing practices of twenty states 
concerning the death penalty for offenders who were younger than eighteen when 
they committed the offense). 
 3. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (“A claim that 
punishment is excessive is judged not by the standards that prevailed . . . when the 
Bill of Rights was adopted, but rather by those that currently prevail.”); Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) (asserting that the Eighth 
Amendment should be interpreted according to “the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society”). 
 4. See, e.g., Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (“Community consensus, while 
‘entitled to great weight,’ is not itself determinative of whether a punishment is 
cruel and unusual.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 
421 (“Consensus is not dispositive.”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313 (“[I]n cases 
involving a consensus, our own judgment is ‘brought to bear,’ by asking whether 
there is reason to disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its 
legislators.” (citation omitted)). 
 5. See infra Part III.A. 
 6. See infra Part III.C. 
 7. William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
780, 849–50 (2006) [hereinafter Stuntz, Political Constitution] (“The Supreme Court 
decided to regulate policing and procedure, and the politicians responded with a 
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underlying this appearance has prevented the courts from protecting 
criminal offenders from the harsher sentences that this pathology has 
caused.8  For most offenders, the Eighth Amendment is an illusion, 
and a harmful one at that. 
This Article shows that the illusory Eighth Amendment is the result 
of the Supreme Court’s decision to use implementation rules as a 
substitute for constitutional interpretation.  For the purposes of this 
Article, an implementation rule is a rule for adjudicating 
constitutional cases that is not itself required or logically entailed by 
the meaning of the Constitution.  Over the past thirty years, scholars 
have shown that implementation rules are a necessary and even 
ubiquitous feature of constitutional adjudication.9  The primary 
purpose of such rules is to minimize cost, including both the cost of 
adjudicative error and the social cost arising from the underlying 
constitutional violation.10 
Surprisingly, the implementation rules literature has paid little 
attention to the nature of constitutional interpretation beyond 
defining it as the effort to determine constitutional meaning.11  This 
                                                          
forty-year backlash of overcriminalization and overpunishment.”); see also, e.g., Erik 
Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703 (2005) (describing 
the overcriminalization phenomenon and critiquing it from a libertarian 
perspective); Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 537 (2012) (arguing that courts have contributed to the 
overcriminalization phenomenon by construing poorly phrased criminal statutes 
expansively); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 505, 509–10 (2001) [hereinafter Stuntz, Pathological Politics] (arguing that 
criminal liability continues to expand at the state and federal level because 
prosecutorial discretion, coupled with the deference afforded to the legislature, 
prevents courts from limiting it).  
 8. See infra Part III.C. 
 9. See infra Part I.B. 
 10. See David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 
192, 193 & n.12 (1988) (arguing that courts regularly devise rules to account for 
both “constitutional values . . . [and] the institutional difficulties that courts face in 
advancing those values”). 
 11. See infra Part II.A.  The distinction between interpretation and 
implementation is similar to the distinction that “new originalist” scholars such as 
Randy Barnett, Lawrence Solum, and Keith Whittington make between 
interpretation and construction.  See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and 
Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66 (2011) (advocating the “new 
originalist” distinction between constitutional interpretation and construction); 
Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
923, 973 (2009) (describing interpretation as “[t]he activity of determining the 
linguistic meaning—or semantic content—of a legal text” and construction as “[t]he 
activity of translating the semantic content of a legal text into legal rules, 
paradigmatically in cases where the meaning of the text is vague”); Keith E. 
Whittington, Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 119, 120–
21 (2010) (“There will be occasions . . . when the Constitution as written cannot in 
good faith be said to provide a determinate answer to a given question.  This is the 
realm of construction.  The process of interpretation may be able to constrain the 
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is an important gap in the literature because the use of 
implementation rules raises legitimacy and efficacy questions that can 
only be answered with reference to interpretation.12  An 
implementation rule enjoys the strongest claim to legitimacy if it 
implements the meaning of the Constitution rather than the court’s 
own substantive policy judgment.13  An implementation rule is 
effective to the extent it minimizes the costs arising from erroneous 
application of constitutional meaning.14  Neither legitimacy nor 
efficacy questions can be answered without some understanding of 
the nature of constitutional meaning and the proper methods to 
interpret it.15 
This Article argues that the purpose of constitutional 
interpretation is to determine “voter’s meaning.”16  Voter’s meaning 
is the meaning imparted to the text by those bodies of lawmakers 
with authority to ratify the Constitution or constitutional 
amendments.17  Voter’s meaning does not include the private 
intentions of the various lawmakers involved in framing and 
ratification.18  A vote in favor of the Constitution, like a vote in favor 
of any other law, signifies that the voter knows and consents to the 
fact that the public meaning of the text will have legal force.19  
Interpretation of the original public meaning of the document is thus 
sufficient to determine both the substantive policy judgments 
contained in the text and the manner in which the text directs those 
                                                          
available readings of the text and limit the permissible set of political options, but 
the interpreter may not be able to say that the text demands a specific result.”). 
Although the present Article ultimately concludes, consistent with the “new 
originalist” position, that interpretation is properly understood as discernment of the 
Constitution’s original public meaning, it does not adopt this position as a starting 
point.  Rather, this Article starts from the perspective of implementation rules 
theory.  It argues that implementation rules, as described by scholars such as Mitchell 
Berman, Richard Fallon Jr. and Kermit Roosevelt III, can neither perform their 
accuracy-enhancing function nor establish their own legitimacy without reference to 
a conception of constitutional interpretation that is distinct from constitutional 
implementation.  This Article further argues that the conception of constitutional 
interpretation that best serves implementation rules theory is the discernment of 
original public meaning.  See infra Part II.A. 
 12. See infra Part II.A.  
 13. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 14. See Strauss, supra note 10, at 193. 
 15. See infra Part I.B. 
 16. “Voter’s meaning,” as used in this Article, is a particular instance of “utterer’s 
meaning,” described more fully below.  Infra Part II.A.1. 
 17. See infra Part II.A.1; see also, Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 375 n.130 (1981) (“[T]he intention of the ratifiers, not the 
Framers, is in principle decisive . . . .”). 
 18. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 19. See infra Part II.A.1. 
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judgments to be embodied in practice.20  At a minimum, this requires 
an effort to determine the semantic content, grammatical and 
structural relations, and historical context of the words contained in 
this document. 
Implementation rules are what courts use when something more is 
needed after constitutional interpretation has been exhausted.  The 
efficacy and legitimacy of such rules depend on the Court’s effort to 
obtain everything it can from interpretation before having recourse 
to rulemaking.  Without such an effort, courts cannot reliably use 
implementation rules to minimize error costs because such rules’ 
relationship to constitutional meaning will be unknown.  Worse, 
unless courts adequately interpret the Constitution before creating 
implementation rules, such rules will necessarily reflect the 
substantive policy judgment of some current governmental actor 
(usually the Court or the legislature) rather than the judgment 
embodied in the Constitution itself.21 
This brings us back to the illusory Eighth Amendment.  A closer 
look at the Supreme Court’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
jurisprudence reveals two important interpretive failures:  First, the 
Court failed to interpret the term “unusual,” transforming the Clause 
into an irredeemably vague prohibition of “cruel punishments.”22  
Second, as a result of this failure, the Court withdrew its traditional 
definition of “excessive” punishments, which is the most important 
category of cruel and unusual punishments.23  The Court has 
replaced the meaning of these concepts with two opposing 
implementation rules.  In cases involving imprisonment of adults,24 
                                                          
 20. See infra Part II.A.1.  This Article does not address the question of whether 
the “legal meaning” of the Constitution is fully exhausted by the semantic meaning 
of the text.  Rather, it makes the more modest claim (in line with Lawrence Solum 
and other originalist scholars) that the semantic meaning of the text contributes to 
the Constitution’s legal meaning, so that any effort to adjudicate constitutional 
questions without resorting to textual interpretation will lead to serious dysfunction.  
See, e.g., Solum, supra note 11, at 953 (“We can use the term ‘contribution’ to denote 
the relationship between semantic content—the linguistic meaning of the text—and 
legal content—the doctrines or rules of constitutional law.”); cf. Lee J. Strang, 
Originalism and the “Challenge of Change”:  Abduced-Principle Originalism and Other 
Mechanisms by Which Originalism Sufficiently Accommodates Changed Social Conditions, 60 
HASTINGS L.J. 927, 966 (2009) (arguing that the Constitution, viewed in light of its 
original meaning, “embodies numerous authoritative, prudential, social-ordering 
decisions that have permitted our society to pursue the common good in a 
reasonably effective manner”). 
 21. See infra Part II.A.  
 22. See infra Part III.A. 
 23. See infra Part III.C. 
 24. This category includes juveniles convicted in the adult system, so long as they 
are sentenced to terms less severe than life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole.  See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012) (invalidating mandatory 
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the Court applies an apparently irrebuttable presumption of 
constitutionality.25  In cases involving the death penalty for non-
homicide offenses, for juveniles and for the intellectually disabled, 
and in cases involving juveniles sentenced to life without possibility of 
parole, the Court applies an apparently irrebuttable presumption of 
unconstitutional excessiveness.26  These presumptions, given in the 
absence of interpretation, amount to a delegation of substantive 
policymaking from the Constitution to a current governmental 
actor.  In one set of cases, the legislature gets to decide what the 
constitutional limits of punishment are; in the other, the Court 
does.  In neither case does constitutional meaning drive the 
decision.  As a result, the legitimacy and efficacy of both 
presumptions are highly questionable. 
This problem will not be resolved by more rulemaking, but only by 
more interpretation.27  As I have previously shown, the word 
“unusual” in the Eighth Amendment does have independent 
meaning:  it means “contrary to long usage.”28  The Eighth 
Amendment does not vaguely forbid cruel punishments:  it specifically 
forbids punishments that are cruel and contrary to long usage or cruel 
and new.29  Recognition of this additional meaning would enable 
the Court to decide questions of ordinal and cardinal 
proportionality more accurately and without unduly broad 
presumptions of constitutionality or unconstitutionality.30  As a 
result, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause would be more 
effective, and the politics of criminal law would be at least slightly 
less pathological.31 
Part I of this Article describes the central claims of implementation 
rules theory, using the paradigmatic case of Miranda v. Arizona32 as 
the primary lens through which to view this area of scholarship.  Part 
II describes the characteristics that distinguish interpretation from 
                                                          
life sentences without the possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders); 
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (invalidating life sentences without 
the possibility of parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders); Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (invalidating the death penalty for juveniles). 
 25. See infra Part III.D.1. 
 26. See infra Part III.D.2. 
 27. See infra Part III.F. 
 28. John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”:  The Eighth Amendment 
as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1745 (2008) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 29. See id. at 1745–46; see also infra Part III.F.   
 30. See infra Part III.F. 
 31. See Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 7, at 509–10 (describing several 
pathologies associated with the American criminal justice system). 
 32. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
STINNEFORD.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2014  3:52 PM 
444 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:437 
implementation, demonstrates that the Supreme Court laid down 
implementation rules in Miranda without first interpreting the 
meaning of “compelled,” and links much of the subsequent 
dysfunction surrounding Miranda to this interpretive failure.  Part III 
shows that the Supreme Court’s “excessive punishment” cases under 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause involve the same kind of 
interpretive failure that occurred in Miranda and seem to be on track 
for creating the same kinds of dysfunction.  This Part also shows how 
interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause can 
resolve the worst elements of this dysfunction. 
I. IMPLEMENTATION RULES 
A. Miranda and the Debate over Prophylactic Rules 
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that when an 
individual is subjected to custodial interrogation, the police must 
warn him that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says 
will be used against him in court, that he has the right to an attorney, 
and that the state will pay for an attorney if he cannot afford one.33  If 
the individual invokes his right to silence or to counsel, all 
questioning must stop.34  The police may interrogate the individual 
only if they obtain a valid waiver of his rights to silence and counsel.35  
If the police violate these rules, any statements obtained from such 
interrogation will be excluded from evidence at trial.36  The basis of 
the Court’s ruling was the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination.37 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda was unusual in many 
respects.  The opinion was almost entirely forward-looking.  The 
Court did not discuss the facts surrounding the confessions under 
review until the very end of the opinion38 and made no finding that 
these confessions had been given involuntarily.39  Instead, it held that 
the risk arising from the “inherently compelling pressures” associated 
with custodial interrogation required the use of the “procedural 
safeguards” described above.40  The Court asserted that, in the future, 
                                                          
 33. Id. at 444. 
 34. Id. at 444–45. 
 35. Id. at 444. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id. at 439. 
 38. See id. at 491–99. 
 39. See id. at 457 (“In these cases, we might not find the defendants’ statements to 
have been involuntary in traditional terms.”). 
 40. Id. at 444, 467; see supra note 33. 
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it would order the exclusion of any statement obtained in violation of 
these safeguards even if it could be shown that the defendant was 
fully aware of his rights.41  Finally, the Court seemed to offer Congress 
and state legislatures a limited power to revise its holding, stating that 
they “are free to develop their own safeguards for the privilege, so 
long as they are fully as effective” as those imposed by the Court.42 
Miranda provoked a wide range of responses in both the political 
and legal realms.43  Two of the most important responses may be 
described as a structural critique and a pragmatic defense.  
Proponents of the structural critique accused the Miranda Court of 
engaging in judicial legislation that violated the Constitution’s 
structural limitations on the judicial role.44  The basic idea, 
                                                          
 41. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468 (“[W]e will not pause to inquire in individual 
cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given.”). 
 42. Id. at 490. 
 43. See, e.g., THE MIRANDA DEBATE:  LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING (Richard A. Leo & 
George C. Thomas III eds., 1998) (collecting articles debating the legitimacy and 
efficacy of Miranda); Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 
1419 (1985) (“Miranda was not a wise or necessary decision, nor has Miranda proved 
to be, as is generally contended, a harmless one.” (footnote omitted)); Paul G. 
Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs:  An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 387, 390 
(1996) (arguing that “Miranda has significantly harmed law enforcement efforts in 
this country”); Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure:  A Question of 
Article III Legitimacy, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 100, 101 (1985) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court’s use of “prophylactic rules” in Miranda and other cases “raise[s] a question of 
constitutional legitimacy”); Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—
Foreword:  Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1975) (arguing that 
cases like Miranda demonstrate that “a surprising amount of what passes as 
authoritative constitutional ‘interpretation’ is best understood as something of a 
quite different order—a substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules 
drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not required by, various 
constitutional provisions; in short, a constitutional common law”); Lawrence 
Rosenthal, Against Orthodoxy:  Miranda Is Not Prophylactic and the Constitution Is Not 
Perfect, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 579, 585 (2007) (arguing that Miranda directly and effectively 
prevents compulsion in custodial interrogation); George C. Thomas III, Separated at 
Birth but Siblings Nonetheless:  Miranda and the Due Process Notice Cases, 99 MICH. L. REV. 
1081, 1083 (2001) (arguing the Miranda and its progeny can best be understood as 
“due process notice” cases); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect:  
Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 505–06 
(1996) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect] (challenging Paul Cassell’s 
claim that Miranda harms law enforcement); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering 
Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435 (1987) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Reconsidering 
Miranda] (defending Miranda against a U.S. Department of Justice report that called 
for it to be overruled); Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 
1519, 1521 (2008) [hereinafter Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda] (arguing that 
Miranda is “largely dead” as a source of protection for criminal suspects); Charles D. 
Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 112 (1998) [hereinafter 
Weisselberg, Saving Miranda] (arguing that the Supreme Court should characterize 
Miranda rules as constitutionally required rather than prophylactic and should 
expand the scope of evidence excluded under Miranda). 
 44. This critique was vividly illustrated by Judge Henry Friendly, who 
“translate[d]” Miranda into the form of a statute entitled, “An Act to implement the 
provision of the Fifth Amendment that ‘No person . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself.’”  HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 267–
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articulated most forcefully by legal scholar Joseph Grano and Justice 
Scalia, is that Miranda improperly required federal and state law 
enforcement to follow a set of “prophylactic rules”—that is, “court-
created rule[s] that can be violated without violating the Constitution 
itself.”45  Such rules are improper because the Constitution does not 
empower judges to create extra-constitutional rules and enforce them 
against other governmental actors; it only empowers judges to 
enforce the Constitution itself.46  Miranda’s prophylactic rules thus 
violated principles of separation of powers and federalism.47 
Defenders of Miranda, most notably Professor David Strauss, 
answered the structural critique with a pragmatic defense.  In an 
essay entitled The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, Strauss asserted that 
rules like those articulated in Miranda “are not exceptional measures 
of questionable legitimacy but are a central and necessary feature of 
constitutional law.”48  Strauss argued that courts deciding 
constitutional cases regularly devise rules that take into account “not 
only the constitutional values at stake, but also the institutional 
difficulties that courts face in advancing those values.”49  Such 
                                                          
68 (1967); see also, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the new required procedural safeguards discourage confessions and demonstrate a 
lack of judicial restraint); Raymond L. Spring, The Nebulous Nexus:  Escobedo, 
Miranda, and the New 5th Amendment, 6 WASHBURN L.J. 428, 442 (1967) (“[T]he court 
has allowed its moral judgment to force it beyond interpretation of the Constitution 
and into the realm of amendment.”). 
 45. Joseph D. Grano, Miranda’s Constitutional Difficulties:  A Reply to Professor 
Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 174, 176–77 (1988) (arguing that the prophylactic 
nature of the Miranda rules undermines their legitimacy); see Dickerson v. United 
States, 530 U.S. 428, 445–46 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Dickerson 
majority’s reading of Miranda wrongly implied that the Supreme Court “has the 
power, not merely to apply the Constitution but to expand it”).  Other scholars have 
also described the Miranda rules as prophylactic.  See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., 
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 141 n.34 (2001) (noting that the Supreme Court 
itself has referred to Miranda’s prescriptions as “prophylactic”); David Cole, The Value 
of Seeing Things Differently:  Boerne v. Flores and Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of 
Rights, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 31, 55–56 (describing Miranda as a “noteworthy example[]” 
of the Supreme Court’s power to create prophylactic rules); David Huitema, 
Miranda:  Legitimate Response to Contingent Requirements of the Fifth Amendment, 18 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 261, 263–64 (2000) (defending the Supreme Court’s authority to 
create prophylactic Miranda rules); Yale Kamisar, Confessions, Search and Seizure and 
the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L. REV. 465, 471 (1999) (“A ‘prophylactic’ rule is not a 
dirty word.  Sometimes such rules are necessary and proper.  The privilege against 
self-incrimination, no less than other constitutional rights, needs ‘breathing space.’  
And prophylactic rules may be the best way to provide it.”). 
 46. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 446 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the claimed 
power to create constitutional prophylactic rules as “an immense and frightening 
anti-democratic power [that] does not exist”). 
 47. See Grano, supra note 44, at 123–24 (arguing that the Supreme Court does 
not have supervisory authority over state courts and may not legitimately impose 
prophylactic rules to govern their procedures). 
 48. Strauss, supra note 10, at 190. 
 49. Id. at 192. 
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difficulties include “error costs,”50 “administrative costs,”51 and 
“institutional capacities.”52  Strauss argued that instrumental 
considerations permeate virtually all constitutional doctrine and 
therefore there is nothing illegitimate or even noteworthy about the 
Miranda rules.53  Strauss’s argument has been read to imply that it is 
pointless even to distinguish between the “meaning” of the 
Constitution and the rules judges devise to implement or enforce it.54  
From a pragmatic perspective, the Constitution’s meaning is its 
implementation—and therefore there is no such thing as a 
“prophylactic rule.”55 
Miranda’s structural critique and pragmatic defense largely talked 
past each other.  Each made points the other could not answer.  It is 
undoubtedly true that judges—including “originalists” like Justice 
Scalia—use rules to implement the Constitution that could be 
characterized as prophylactic.56  But it is also true, as Grano and 
Scalia argued, that the Constitution does not give judges a free-
floating power to create new extra-constitutional rights.57 
B. Breaking the Impasse:  Constitutional Implementation Rules 
The debate described above presented itself as a battle over the 
proper methods of constitutional interpretation:  must judges restrict 
themselves to enforcing the meaning of the constitutional text, or 
may they announce constitutional rules that sweep more broadly than 
the text?  In recent years, however, scholars have increasingly 
recognized that constitutional adjudication involves at least two 
                                                          
 50. Id. at 193. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 207. 
 53. See id. at 204 (arguing that the “prophylactic approach” is a “normal part of 
constitutional law”). 
 54. See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 45–46 
(2004) (“Prophylactic rules are ubiquitous, [Strauss] says, not because court-
announced doctrine consists of lots of outputs that overprotect court-interpreted 
constitutional meaning, but because there is only one sort of output—‘constitutional 
doctrine’—much of which has the same ‘prophylactic’ relationship to ‘the real, 
noumenal Constitution’ as does Miranda.  Viewed in this light, then, Strauss’s 
contention is not so much that prophylactic rules (in Grano’s sense) are ubiquitous, 
but that they are nonexistent.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Strauss, supra note 10, 
at 207–08)). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification:  How the Law Becomes What 
the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1670–71 (2005) (describing Justice Scalia’s implicit 
endorsement of a prophylactic constitutional rule in Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 
(2000)). 
 57. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.  Strauss himself acknowledged 
that a constitutional rule based simply on the Court’s judgment that it will make 
the world “a better place” would have a “legitimacy problem.”  Strauss, supra note 
10, at 194. 
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distinct judicial activities:  interpretation and implementation.58  The 
key insight is that even the most concrete constitutional provision 
cannot be enforced without the use of judicially created rules that 
help us determine whether the provision has been violated.59  For 
example, although the Constitution’s age requirement for United 
States senators is clear and unambiguous,60 a court could not decide a 
case challenging a candidate’s compliance with this requirement 
without employing implementation rules that do not themselves flow 
directly from the Constitution.  For example, who should bear the 
burden of proof?  How strong should that burden be?  Should the 
court employ a presumption of compliance or noncompliance?  If so, 
should such a presumption either limit or broaden the types of 
evidence considered sufficient to establish or negate the claim?  
None of these questions can be answered simply through 
interpretation of Article I, Section 3—but they must be answered 
to adjudicate the claim.  Even in cases presenting no interpretive 
problem, implementation rules are necessary and (to quote 
Strauss) “ubiquitous.”61 
                                                          
 58. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 54, at 58 & n.192 (distinguishing between 
“constitutional operative proposition[s]” and “constitutional decision rule[s]”); 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court 1996 Term—Foreword:  Implementing the 
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 57 (1997) (“[I]dentifying the ‘meaning’ of the 
Constitution is not the Court’s only function.  A crucial mission of the Court is to 
implement the Constitution successfully.  In service of this mission, the Court often 
must craft doctrine that is driven by the Constitution, but does not reflect the 
Constitution’s meaning precisely.”). 
 59. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 54, at 35 (“[T]he application of constitutional 
meaning to the facts of a given ‘case or controversy’ is often mediated by judge-made 
tests of constitutional law that are not most fairly understood as themselves products 
of judicial constitutional interpretation.”).  Two of the most important early 
proponents of the distinction between constitutional meaning and constitutional 
doctrine were Professors Lawrence Sager and Henry Monaghan.  See generally 
Monaghan, supra note 43; Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure:  The Legal Status of 
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).  Numerous scholars 
accept the distinction between constitutional meaning and constitutional doctrine.  
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Foreword:  The Document and 
the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 79 (2000) (arguing that Article III envisions that 
“judges will offer interpretations of [the Constitution’s] meaning, give reasons for 
those interpretations, develop mediating principles, and craft implementing 
frameworks enabling the document to work as in-court law”); Charles Fried, 
Commentary, Constitutional Doctrine, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1140, 1140 (1994) 
(describing “constitutional doctrine” as “the “rules and principles of 
constitutional law . . . that are capable of statement and that generally guide the 
decisions of courts, the conduct of government officials, and the arguments and 
counsel of lawyers”); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 
U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 883 (1996) (arguing that in practice, constitutional doctrine 
has priority over constitutional text). 
 60. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (“No Person shall be a Senator who shall not 
have attained to the Age of thirty Years . . . .”). 
 61. Berman, supra note 54, at 13–14 (citing Strauss, supra note 10). 
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1. The functions of implementation rules 
Professor Mitchell Berman, one of the foremost implementation 
rules theorists, distinguishes between “constitutional operative 
propositions” and “constitutional decision rules.”62  Berman defines a 
“constitutional operative proposition” as “the judicial statement or 
understanding of constitutional meaning.”63  In other words, it is the 
product of constitutional interpretation.  A constitutional decision 
rule, on the other hand, “states the test for deciding whether the 
terms of the operative proposition are satisfied.”64  In other words, a 
constitutional decision rule is a judicial implementation rule. 
Berman argues that the primary function of a constitutional 
decision rule is to enhance the accuracy of constitutional 
adjudication.65  To borrow the terminology of science, the function of 
such a rule is to minimize the sum of error costs resulting from “false 
negatives” (judicial failures to recognize a constitutional violation 
where one has occurred) and “false positives” (judicial findings of a 
constitutional violation where none has occurred).66 
Error costs need not be measured in a purely quantitative fashion 
because sometimes a false negative can cause greater harm than a 
false positive (and vice versa).67  For example, if the Equal Protection 
Clause means that the government may not treat one group of 
people worse than another for illegitimate reasons, the rule requiring 
strict scrutiny of racial classifications is likely to result in an increased 
number of false positives.68  Under this standard, the Court will treat 
virtually any law that makes a racial classification as unconstitutional 
even if the classification furthers a legitimate, not invidious, 
                                                          
 62. Id. at 9.  
 63. Id. at 79–80. 
 64. Id. at 80. 
 65. See id. at 98 (“The consideration that would seem to enjoy the strongest claim 
to legitimacy is an interest in reducing adjudicatory error.”).  
 66. See id. at 93 (“The most obvious factor that a decision-rule-maker should consider, 
then, is how best to minimize . . . the sum of false positives and false negatives.”). 
 67. Id. (“A court could think that a particular decision rule is likely to minimize 
either the sum total of adjudicatory errors, or the sum total of weighted errors, 
taking account of a difference in perceived social disutility between false negatives 
and false positives.”); see also Roosevelt, supra note 56, at 1662 (arguing that in 
formulating decision rules, courts may “assess the costs of error—things such 
as the harm to the individual, the importance of the governmental interest 
likely to be thwarted, the ability of the government to achieve its legitimate 
aims by other means—and adopt a decision rule reflecting the relative costs of 
each kind of error”). 
 68. See, e.g., Roosevelt, supra note 56, at 1661 (describing strict scrutiny as an 
implementation “rule that predictably strikes down valid laws but upholds almost 
no violations”). 
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purpose.69  But because of the great social harm that flows from laws 
perpetuating racial subordination, a larger number of false positives 
may be less costly than a smaller number of false negatives.70  
Likewise, the strong deference that courts normally give the 
legislative and executive branches in cases involving war powers 
obviously increases the likelihood of false negatives.71  Courts will 
treat Congress and the President as though they acted within the 
range of their constitutional authority in some cases where they have 
actually exceeded it.  Still, this may be the least costly approach to the 
issue, given the great harm that may flow from erroneous judicial 
interference with battlefield decisions.  In this context, false 
negatives” may be less costly than false positives.” 
Berman also argues that courts may properly consider the effect a 
decision rule will have on the likelihood that governmental actors will 
violate the Constitution in the first place.72  A rule that creates a 
substantial number of false negatives may not adequately deter 
government officials from violating the Constitution.73  Similarly, a 
rule that creates a substantial number of false positives may over-deter 
or “chill[]” the actions of government officials in a way that 
undermines their capacity to do their jobs effectively.74  If greater 
social harm is likely to flow from a given constitutional violation than 
from the threat of overdeterrence, the Court may appropriately 
employ a more protective rule.  If the balance of harms leans the 
other way, the Court may appropriately employ a less protective rule. 
Some considerations that are unrelated to accuracy still have a 
claim to legitimacy.  Among these are what Berman calls “fiscal” 
and “institutional” concerns.75  Courts sometimes devise rules 
designed, in part, to reduce the cost of litigation to the parties or 
                                                          
 69. Gerald Gunther famously described strict scrutiny as “strict in theory and 
fatal in fact” because the Supreme Court’s decisions that use strict scrutiny 
virtually always result in invalidation of the statute at issue.  Gerald Gunther, The 
Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword:  In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing 
Court:  A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 70. See Roosevelt, supra note 56, at 1662–63 (“Cost-benefit analysis . . . offers 
one explanation for strict scrutiny:  Judges look more closely at laws that inflict 
greater harms.”). 
 71. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981) (stating that “judicial 
deference . . . is at its apogee” when Congress exercises its war powers); United States 
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (noting that courts give “utmost deference” to the 
President in cases involving national security). 
 72. See Berman, supra note 54, at 93; see also Roosevelt, supra note 56, at 1666–67 
(arguing that it is appropriate for the Supreme Court to consider how its 
implementation rule is likely to affect the conduct of governmental actors). 
 73. See Berman, supra note 54, at 93. 
 74. See id. at 94 (highlighting the negative effects of “overdeterrence”). 
 75. See id. at 95. 
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to the court, to preserve the court’s “moral authority” or to 
minimize “interbranch friction.”76 
The concern with the weakest claim to legitimacy is what 
Berman calls a “substantive” consideration, meaning a decision to 
supplement or replace a constitutional norm with the judge’s own 
substantive value or policy judgment.77  Like Strauss before him, 
Berman recognizes that a decision rule based purely on the 
judge’s belief that it will make the world a better place is 
improper, although he expresses doubt that rules based on such 
considerations are common.78 
2. The Miranda rules as implementation rules 
It is now time to turn back to Miranda v. Arizona, the case that gave 
rise to the structural/pragmatic impasse described above.  Can the 
Miranda rules be justified as implementation rules? 
Professor Mitchell Berman thinks they can.  He argues that 
Miranda can be read as announcing two constitutional “operative 
propositions” (interpretations of constitutional meaning) and a set of 
accuracy-enhancing constitutional decision rules (implementation 
rules).79  As noted above, Miranda was based on the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against compelled self-incrimination.  According to Berman, 
Miranda’s operative propositions are that (1) courts should not admit 
into evidence statements that have been compelled by the police,80 
and (2) “compel” means the use of pressure inconsistent with 
principles of personal freedom or dignity, even though such pressure 
may not be strong enough to make the statement involuntary under 
the Due Process Clause.81 
Miranda’s implementation rule is that statements obtained through 
custodial interrogation will be presumed to be compelled unless 
police follow the detailed set of “procedural safeguards” described 
above, including the requirements of warning and waiver.82  Berman 
argues that these safeguards are best seen as accuracy-enhancing 
                                                          
 76. Id.; see also Roosevelt, supra note 56, at 1665 (“Some constitutional operative 
propositions may require courts to decide questions that they simply cannot, or that 
they cannot without burdensome or intrusive evidence-gathering.”). 
 77. Berman, supra note 54, at 95. 
 78. See id. at 97 (“[I]t is hard to credit that courts should enjoy effectively 
unconstrained authority to craft constitutional decision rules.”); see also Strauss, supra 
note 10, at 194 (asserting that Miranda would have a “legitimacy problem” if it were 
simply based on the Supreme Court’s belief that the Miranda rules would make the 
world “a better place”). 
 79. Berman, supra note 54, at 51. 
 80. See id. at 117–18. 
 81. See id. at 120–23 & n.366. 
 82. Id. at 126; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966). 
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decision rules.83  The Supreme Court noted in Miranda that it is 
difficult for courts to tell what actually happens during custodial 
interrogation because it generally happens behind closed doors.84  
Thus, in any given case, it is hard to tell whether the police have used 
custodial interrogation to compel a statement from a suspect.85  The 
problem was exacerbated by the fact that the Miranda Court 
interpreted “compelled” broadly, making case-by-case sorting of 
compelled and non-compelled statements difficult.86  Miranda’s 
procedural safeguards were supposed to help solve this problem by 
reducing the likelihood that a statement obtained during custodial 
interrogation will actually be compelled.87  If a defendant knows of 
his right to silence and right to an attorney, Berman argues, and the 
police are required to respect invocation of such a right, custodial 
interrogation can be expected to produce fewer compelled 
statements than it would without the safeguards.88  By reducing the 
likelihood of actual compulsion, the Miranda rules reduce the 
likelihood that a court will mistakenly admit a compelled statement 
into evidence.  Of course, sometimes there will be a question of 
compulsion even where the procedural safeguards are followed, but 
courts can decide such issues on a case-by-case basis.89 
Professor Berman’s reading of Miranda as an “implementation 
rules” case is clear and powerful.  Whether it is based on the most 
plausible reading of Miranda will be discussed more fully below. 
II. DISTINGUISHING INTERPRETATION FROM IMPLEMENTATION:         
THE CASE OF MIRANDA V. ARIZONA 
A. Implementation Versus Interpretation 
As discussed above,90 implementation-rules theory is premised on 
two related propositions:  First, the primary function of 
implementation rules is to reduce the risk that constitutional 
meaning will be applied erroneously in constitutional litigation.  
Second, it is improper for judges to devise implementation rules 
based on “substantive considerations,” defined as the judges’ own 
                                                          
 83. See Berman, supra note 54, at 132 (identifying the purpose of “deterring 
police overreaching”). 
 84. 384 U.S. at 448. 
 85. Berman, supra note 54, at 127. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 127–28. 
 88. See id. at 128. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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substantive policy preferences separate and apart from those 
embodied in the Constitution itself. 
These propositions imply that constitutional interpretation, 
defined as the effort to discern constitutional meaning, is a vitally 
important activity that is necessarily distinct from constitutional 
implementation.  We cannot tell whether an implementation rule 
reduces the risk that constitutional meaning will be applied 
erroneously unless we start with some idea of what the Constitution 
means.91  Similarly, we cannot tell whether an implementation rule is 
based on the judges’ own substantive policy preferences or the policy 
preferences embodied in the Constitution unless we have some 
method for determining what the Constitution means.  If 
implementation rules theory is to be useful, interpretation and 
implementation must be distinguished from each other.92 
Surprisingly, implementation rules theorists have said little about 
the nature of interpretation.  For example, Mitchell Berman writes 
that interpretation is the process of determining “constitutional 
meaning,” whereas implementation is the process of determining 
whether a given action comports with that meaning.93  But he then 
                                                          
 91. See Roosevelt, supra note 56, at 1711–12 (“Repeatedly, the Court has come to 
treat its decision rules as if they were operative propositions, and repeatedly the 
confusion has warped the doctrine.”).  Roosevelt calls the tendency to equate 
Supreme Court doctrine with the actual meaning of the Constitution “the fallacy of 
perfect enforcement.”  See id. at 1651. 
 92. Understanding the distinction between interpretation and implementation 
may also enable implementation rules theory to perform its intended function of 
improving constitutional culture.  Several proponents of implementation rules 
theory have expressed the hope that recognition that certain constitutional doctrines 
are actually implementation rules will allow the Court to modify the rules when their 
premises no longer obtain.  Such recognition may also permit more interplay 
between judicial and legislative branches in determining the proper means of 
constitutional implementation.  See, e.g., Berman, supra note 54, at 16 (“[W]e might 
find our political culture enriched by being able to contemplate constitutional 
operative propositions alone, divorced from the constitutional decision rules which 
are designed solely to govern litigation.”); id. at 101–02 (“[T]he distinction between 
constitutional operative propositions and decision rules makes clear that courts 
could afford Congress a more substantial role in [implementing the Constitution] 
even if they choose not to defer to congressional interpretations of constitutional 
meaning.”); Roosevelt, supra note 56, at 1716 (“One of the virtues of the decision 
rules perspective is that it allows us to see how judicial supremacy in constitutional 
interpretation can coexist with fairly robust forms of departmentalism or popular 
constitutionalism.”); Sager, supra note 59, at 1240 (advocating for “a vision of judicial 
and legislative cooperation in the molding of concrete standards through which 
elusive and complex constitutional norms . . . can come to be applied”).  See generally 
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People:  Juricentric 
Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 28 (2003) (“The Constitution . . . does 
not live in our society as mere ukase.  Disputes about the Constitution often raise 
deep questions of social meaning and collective identity . . . .  [A]lthough 
constitutional law may be useful for settling disputes, the Constitution itself is not 
reducible to this function.”). 
 93. See Berman, supra note 54, at 9. 
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asserts that because there are different “plausible conceptions of 
constitutional meaning,” the line between interpretation and 
implementation cannot be clearly defined.94  If one believes that 
constitutional interpretation should be non-instrumental, one is 
likely to draw the line between interpretation and implementation 
differently than would a pragmatist who believes that 
interpretation is just as instrumental as implementation.  Because 
Berman considers both approaches to constitutional 
interpretation “plausible,” he avoids defining interpretation in a 
manner that would exclude either approach.95 
This avoidance is costly.  As noted above, the legitimacy and utility 
of implementation rules depend largely on their relation to a correct 
understanding of constitutional meaning.  Unless there is some real 
difference between the act of discerning constitutional meaning 
and the act of implementing it, there seems to be little point to 
implementation rules theory.  Put differently, implementation 
rules theory cannot get us beyond the structural/pragmatic 
impasse described above in Part I.A if constitutional interpretation 
and implementation involve exactly the same practical and 
political concerns.   
Constitutional interpretation, conceived as the first step in an 
adjudicative process that involves both interpretation and 
implementation, is a receptive rather than a creative activity.  The 
Constitution is a form of communication analogous to an ordinary 
speech act.96  In both cases, the first step a reader must take in order 
to deal with the speech act is to attempt to understand the meaning it 
contains.97  This effort is receptive and non-instrumental.  It involves 
the use of ordinary interpretive tools, including determination of 
                                                          
 94. Id. at 80. 
 95. See id. 
 96. Numerous scholars have seen a useful analogy between constitutional or 
statutory text and an ordinary speech act.  For some notable examples, see Larry 
Alexander, All or Nothing at All?  The Intentions of Authority and the Authority of 
Intentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION:  ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 357 (Andrei 
Marmor, ed., 1995); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is that English You’re 
Speaking?”  Why Intention-Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967 
(2004); Stanley Fish, There Is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629 (2005); 
Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Against Theory, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 723 
(1982); Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Not a Matter of Interpretation, 42 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 651 (2005); Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, A Reply to Our 
Critics, 9 CRITICAL INQUIRY 790 (1983).  But see Mark Greenberg, Legislation as 
Communication?  Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic Communication, in 
PHILOSPOHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 217 (Andrei Marmor & Scott 
Soames eds., 2011). 
 97. See infra Part II.A.1. 
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semantic content and analysis of grammatical and logical structure.98  
It also involves the use of history and inquiry into the speaker’s 
purpose.  But the overall effort is directed at determining the 
speaker’s meaning.  Although knowledge of history or of the 
speaker’s purpose may assist in determining the speaker’s meaning, it 
may not appropriately be substituted for the speaker’s meaning.99  By 
contrast, the act of constitutional implementation is the effort to 
“deal with” the meaning discerned through interpretation.  As 
described in Part I, above, this effort may appropriately be 
creative and instrumental, so long as its overall orientation is to 
reduce the costs associated with erroneous application of 
constitutional meaning. 
The following subsections sketch out a distinction between 
interpretation and implementation by focusing on the purposive 
nature of the act of interpretation, the particular problems associated 
with determining the meaning of the constitutional text, and the 
methods appropriate to the effectuation of the interpreter’s purpose. 
1. The meaning of “meaning” 
Practitioners of implementation rules theory have defined 
interpretation as the act of discerning constitutional meaning.  This 
subsection’s purpose is not to provide a comprehensive theory of 
interpretation, but to focus more narrowly on what differentiates 
interpretation from implementation.  Still, it is worthwhile to pause at 
the outset and consider what “meaning” really means. 
Mitchell Berman has identified several possible definitions of 
“meaning.”  These include “[u]tterer’s meaning,” “[w]ord-sequence 
meaning,” and “[u]tterance meaning.”100  Utterer’s meaning is the 
meaning that a speaker or writer intends to convey through words.101  
Word-sequence meaning is the meaning that could plausibly be 
derived from the semantic content and syntactic relations of a series 
of words, irrespective of the intent of the speaker.102  Finally, 
utterance meaning is the meaning that an interpreter ends up taking 
                                                          
 98. For a classic discussion of the ways in which constitutional interpretation 
relies on both semantic and structural analysis, see Charles L. Black, Jr., Structure 
and Relationship in Constitutional Law 8 (1969) (noting “a close and perpetual 
interworking between the textual and the relational and structural modes of 
reasoning”).  See also Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate:  Theory of the Constitution 
74–92 (1982). 
 99. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 100. Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 43 (2009). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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from the text, in light of the interpreter’s overall knowledge of the 
utterance, utterer, and other relevant context.103 
Word-sequence meaning is obviously not an adequate basis for 
constitutional interpretation.  As Steven Knapp and Walter Benn 
Michaels pointed out over thirty years ago, language is only subject to 
interpretation because it is supposed to communicate meaning from 
a speaker or set of speakers to a listener or set of listeners.104  For 
example, imagine that you come across a rock formation containing a 
pattern that appears to spell out, “Beware of the dog.”  If you 
attribute “meaning” to this pattern, you will only do so because you 
posit some person—natural or supernatural—who placed it there for 
the purpose of conveying a message.  If you understand the pattern 
to be an accidental occurrence, it would make no sense to interpret 
the “meaning” of the apparent words.  “Word-sequence meaning” 
thus does not appear to be a true alternative to “utterer’s meaning.”  
Rather, it appears to be a description of one of the means by which 
the utterer’s meaning may be conveyed to the interpreter. 
The same goes for “utterance meaning.”  As noted above, Berman 
describes “utterance meaning” as the meaning an interpreter actually 
draws from an utterance, given the interpreter’s knowledge of 
semantic and syntactic conventions and of all relevant context.105  
Although interpretation based on utterance meaning draws on a 
broader range of tools than word-sequence meaning—as it includes 
all relevant context—the overall purpose of interpretation still seems 
to be discernment of the speaker’s meaning. 
Berman denies that this is so.  To illustrate his point, he imagines a 
radio station contest for free Rolling Stones tickets.106  The contest 
organizer announces that it will not accept entries “received before 
12:00 a.m. Thursday,” mistakenly believing that “12:00 a.m.” is a 
synonym for noon.107  What is the “meaning” of the announcement?  
As a matter of “word-sequence meaning,” the entries can be received 
any time after midnight.108  As a matter of “utterer’s meaning,” the 
                                                          
 103. Id.  Berman also identifies a form of meaning he calls “[l]udic meaning,” 
which he defines as “any meanings that can be attributed to either a brute text (a 
word sequence in a language), or a text-as-utterance, in virtue of interpretive play 
constrained by only the loosest requirements of plausibility, intelligibility, or 
interest.”  Id.  Ludic meaning appears to be a category that encompasses the other 
three, but with looser—and essentially undefined—constraints.  For this reason, I do 
not discuss it as a separate category of potential “meaning.” 
 104. See Knapp & Michaels, supra note 96, at 724. 
 105. See supra text accompanying note 103. 
 106. Berman, supra note 100, at 45. 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. 
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entries cannot be received until noon.109  As a matter of “utterance 
meaning,” the entries may be received at either noon or midnight, 
depending on the interpreter’s knowledge of context.110  Berman 
argues that in this situation, nonintentionalist approaches to 
meaning (word-sequence or utterance meaning) are more 
plausible than the intentionalist (utterance meaning) approach.111  
The announcement means what it says, not what the author 
intended it to say. 
The problem with Berman’s analysis is that it ignores the purposive 
nature of both the act of utterance and the act of interpretation, and 
the ways in which these purposes interrelate.  When a person speaks 
to another person, the speaker’s purpose is to convey a meaning or 
set of meanings through words.  Similarly, when a person interprets 
the words of another, her purpose is to understand the meaning the 
utterer intends to convey.  Meaning does not inhere in words 
themselves.  Words are more accurately thought of as vessels that 
carry meaning, or signs that point to it.112 
These points may be illustrated by looking more closely at 
Berman’s radio station contest.  In this hypothetical, the contest 
organizer meant to communicate an intention, namely, the time at 
which the radio station planned to start accepting entries.  The 
contestants’ purpose in interpreting the announcement was to learn 
the same intention that the speaker was communicating, so that they 
could turn in their entries at the right time.  The speaker’s use of the 
wrong semantic convention (“12:00 a.m.” instead of “12:00 p.m.”) 
made fulfillment of both the speaker’s and the interpreters’ purpose 
more difficult.  But did it change the announcement’s “meaning”? 
Imagine first that every person who hears the announcement 
understands that the radio station actually intends to accept 
applications starting at noon.  Perhaps they all assume that that 
“a.m.” is just a typo, or perhaps they all know that the concert 
organizer habitually makes this mistake.  Where the word-sequence 
reflects neither the speaker’s intended meaning nor the hearer’s 
understanding of the speaker’s meaning, can it be said to reflect the 
“meaning” of the announcement?  Presumably not.  The organizer’s 
use of “a.m.” is like the natural rock formation that says, “Beware of 
the dog.”  Because neither the speaker nor the interpreter 
                                                          
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 45–46. 
 111. Id. at 47.  
 112. See generally, e.g., SAINT AUGUSTINE, ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE (R.P.H. Green, 
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1997) (describing language as consisting of signs—that is, 
things that point to other things).  
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understands this word-sequence to reflect the speaker’s intended 
meaning, it is not a bearer of meaning. 
Now imagine that some listeners understand that the contest starts 
at noon, while others think it starts at midnight.  Whose 
understanding accurately reflects the meaning of the announcement?  
Berman thinks that it is more plausible to say that the “meaning” of 
the announcement is that the contest starts at midnight, even though 
this “meaning” does not reflect the organizer’s intention, because it is 
“the most equitable resolution” and “is most consistent with the 
functions that public announcements are designed to serve—to 
provide clear notice and certainty, without requiring the addressees 
to inquire deeply beyond the face of the document.”113  But public 
announcements are, of course, not designed to provide “notice” in 
the abstract; they are designed to provide notice of something.  In 
Berman’s hypothetical, the “something” is the time at which the radio 
station intends to start taking applications.  The “word-sequence 
meaning” of the announcement misstates this.  It seems strange to say 
that the listeners who interpreted the announcement according to its 
word-sequence meaning correctly interpreted the meaning of the 
message, despite the fact that they failed to learn the “something”—
the time at which the radio station intended to start accepting 
applications—they sought.  It seems more plausible simply to say that, 
with respect to this group of listeners, the announcement failed to 
communicate the organizer’s meaning. 
This is where the distinction between interpretation and 
implementation comes in.  The question arising from Berman’s radio 
station contest is not, “What did the announcement mean?” but, 
“What should we do in light of the fact that the speaker failed to 
communicate his message?”  Should we enforce the meaning the 
speaker intended but failed to communicate, or should we do 
something else?  In the case of the radio station contest, should we 
only allow those entries that were submitted after noon, or should we 
also permit entries by those participants who submitted entries 
between 12:00 a.m. and noon?  These are very important questions, 
and versions of them arise in all sorts of legal contexts.114  But they 
are not questions of interpretation.  They are questions of what to do 
when communication (and therefore interpretation) fails. 
                                                          
 113. Berman, supra note 100, at 46–47. 
 114. For example, even textualists like Justice Scalia recognize the doctrine of 
“scrivener’s error,” which allows the Court to depart from the plain meaning of a 
statutory or constitutional text where “the meaning genuinely intended” by the 
legislature is “absolutely clear” but “inadequately expressed.”  United States v. X-
Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 82 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
STINNEFORD.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2014  3:52 PM 
2013] THE ILLUSORY EIGHTH AMENDMENT 459 
As this example illustrates, the core purpose of interpretation is to 
determine the meaning that a speaker or set of speakers has 
attempted to communicate to an interpreter through some form of 
communicative convention. 
2. Determining the meaning of the constitutional text 
Establishing that “meaning” means “utterer’s meaning” does not 
solve the problem of constitutional interpretation, for the 
Constitution presents two interpretive problems we do not encounter 
when dealing with an ordinary speech act.  First, who counts as the 
“utterer” of the Constitution?  The individuals who drafted it?  The 
Constitutional Convention that proposed it to the states for 
ratification?  The various State Ratifying Conventions?  Some 
combination thereof?  Second, assuming we identify the relevant 
groups of “utterers,” how do we determine the subjective intentions 
of any multi-member body?115 
The first problem—the identity of the “utterer” of the 
Constitution—is not difficult to solve.  In principle, the utterer whose 
meaning matters is the utterer who has authority to speak with the 
force of law.  In the case of ordinary legislation, the relevant utterer is 
the legislature empowered to enact legislation.  In the case of the 
U.S. Constitution, the relevant utterers are the state conventions that 
ratified the Constitution and thus made it the supreme law of the 
land.116  In the case of the Bill of Rights, the relevant utterers are the 
                                                          
 115. One commonly stated objection to viewing the Constitution as an expression 
of a speaker’s purpose is that numerous individuals with various motives and 
understandings were involved in drafting and ratifying the Constitution, such that 
the Framers’ and ratifiers’ “intent” or “purpose” is not discernible.  See, e.g., Matthew 
D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law:  A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1374 
(2000) (“Notwithstanding the common scholarly habit . . . of referring to the 
‘purposes’ or ‘intentions’ or ‘motivations’ of legal bodies, there typically is no such 
thing (at least for multimember bodies such as courts or legislatures).” (footnote 
omitted)); Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 
277, 351 (1985) (expressing skepticism about the idea of legislative intent); Jeremy 
Waldron, Legislators’ Intentions and Unintentional Legislation, in LAW AND 
INTERPRETATION:  ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 329, 353 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) 
(same).  Some scholars have argued that it is possible to speak meaningfully of the 
underlying “purpose” of a document issued by a multi-member body.  See, e.g., 
Mitchell N. Berman, Guillen and Gullibility:  Piercing the Surface of Commerce Clause 
Doctrine, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1487, 1517 & n.132 (2004) (“Of course the actions produced 
by multimember bodies consisting of human agents can be produced for 
purposes.”).  I am discussing a narrower sort of purpose here:  the purpose to convey 
the meaning of the statement issued by the multi-member body. 
 116. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 
CONST. COMMENT. 427, 445 (2007) (“[S]urely it was the ratifiers’ views that counted 
because only they had the authority to make the proposed Constitution law.”); 
Monaghan, supra note 17, at 375 n.130 (noting that “the intention of the ratifiers, 
not the Framers, is in principle decisive,” but expressing doubt as to whether such 
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First Congress and the state legislatures that authorized amending 
the Constitution. 
The second problem—the difficulty in ascertaining the subjective 
intentions of the relevant group of utters—is only a problem because 
“legislative intent” is often conceived in imprecise and even 
incoherent terms.  A member of Congress, a state legislature, or a 
state ratifying convention may have many different motivations to 
vote for the Constitution or a constitutional amendment.  The 
member may do so out of a hope that the provision will have some 
specific real-world effect, or out of a desire to show support for a 
given party or platform, or with no specific end in mind at all.  The 
member might even vote for the provision without reading it or 
knowing specifically what it says.  But neither the hopes, nor the 
motivations, nor the subjective understandings of the various 
legislators involved in enacting a constitutional provision are directly 
legally relevant.  All that matters is what the members intended to say 
through their vote. 
The best way to understand this distinction is by analogizing a vote 
to approve a constitutional amendment to a vote for a given 
presidential candidate.  In the 2000 presidential election, many 
people voted for Ralph Nader.117  Some of these voters may have 
actually wanted Nader to be elected President.  Others definitely did 
not want Nader to be elected President, but voted for him to register 
dissatisfaction with the major political parties.118  Still others may not 
have known who Nader was, but voted for him simply because they 
liked his name.  Although these voters had many different—often 
conflicting—intentions in casting votes for Nader, they shared one 
                                                          
intentions can actually be discerned); Strang, supra note 20, at 966 (“The 
Constitution’s original meaning is the meaning that enables the Framers and 
Ratifiers to communicate their decisions to us, and for Americans to coordinate their 
actions in accord with those decisions.”). 
 117. See 2000 Official Presidential General Election Results, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION 
(Dec. 2001), http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm (indicating that 
2,882,955 individuals (2.74%) voted for Ralph Nader). 
 118. See Andrew Cohen, The Case Against Protest Voting (Remember Ralph Nader), THE 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 18, 2012, 11:30 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive 
/2012/10/the-case-against-protest-voting-remember-ralph-nader/263721 (asserting 
that those who cast “protest votes” for Ralph Nader deprived Al Gore of the 
election); Ellen Willis, Vote for Ralph Nader!, SALON (Nov. 6, 2000, 3:36 PM), 
http://www.salon.com/2000/11/06/willis_2 (“I’m voting for Ralph Nader . . . in the 
hope that the Green Party will get 5 percent of the vote.”); Phillip Locker, Is a Nader 
Vote a Wasted Vote?—The Case Against Lesser-Evilism, SOCIALIST ALTERNATIVE (Aug. 28, 
2008), http://www.socialistalternative.org/news/article10.php?id=902 (“The best 
way to gain the maximum concessions from the political establishment is to build the 
strongest challenge to them.  A strong vote for Nader could bring real pressure to 
bear on whichever corporate candidate is elected to deliver concessions or else risk a 
further erosion of their base to left-wing political challengers.”). 
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intention in common:  each knew and consented to the fact that his 
or her vote would count toward the election of Nader and that if he 
garnered a majority of votes he would be elected President.  They 
may not have wanted Nader to garner a majority of votes, and they 
may not have believed it was within the realm of reasonable 
possibility.  But they knew what the effect would be if a majority voted 
for Nader, and they consented to this fact.  When it comes to voters, 
this is the only intention that matters:  knowledge of and consent to 
the fact that the words for which you vote will have legal effect if a 
sufficient number of people vote the same way. 
The same principle applies to members of Congress, state 
legislatures, or state ratifying conventions who vote for the 
Constitution or a constitutional amendment.  They know that if a 
sufficient number of the relevant lawmakers vote for the provision at 
issue, it will have the force of law.  Because the Constitution conveys 
meaning through a widely shared set of semantic and syntactic 
conventions, it is not important to determine what the private 
intentions or motivations of the ratifiers might have been.  The 
decision to vote for a constitutional amendment—like the decision to 
vote for Ralph Nader—represents the intention to approve the 
meaning ordinarily conveyed by the semantic and syntactic 
conventions employed within the document, within the overall 
context of the document’s promulgation.  Thus, the important 
question in constitutional interpretation is what meaning the 
Constitution actually conveys, not what intentions or motivations lay 
underneath it.119 
3. Meaning, purpose, and “instrumental” interpretation 
If interpretation is the effort to discern meaning that a speaker 
communicates, myriad questions about the proper modes of 
                                                          
 119. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:  THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW 144 (1990) (“[W]hat the ratifiers understood themselves to be enacting 
must be taken to be what the public of that time would have understood the words to 
mean.”); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1337, 1341–42 (1998) (“Even if we cannot know 
the actual intent of the legislature, we can at least charge each legislator with the 
intention ‘to say what one would be normally understood as saying, given the 
circumstances in which one said it.’” (quoting Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, 
in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW:  ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 249, 268 (Robert P. George 
ed., 1996))).  See generally Barnett, supra note 11, at 66 (“Although we can choose to 
use words however we wish, as Alice discovered in Wonderland, the social or 
interpersonal linguistic meaning of words is an empirical fact beyond the will or 
control of any given speaker . . . .  Although the objective meaning of words 
sometimes evolves, words have an objective social meaning at any given time that is 
independent of our opinions of that meaning, and this meaning can typically be 
discovered by empirical investigation.”). 
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interpretation remain.  This subsection does not attempt to answer 
them all, but focuses on the minimum requirements one would 
expect for a good-faith interpretation of an utterance.  This effort 
involves the use of ordinary interpretive tools, including 
determination of semantic content, analysis of grammatical and 
logical structure, knowledge of history, and inquiry into the speaker’s 
purpose.  The speaker’s purpose may not appropriately be 
substituted for the speaker’s meaning, although the “meaning” of 
broadly worded pronouncements may sometimes be virtually 
identical to their “purpose.”  At its core, a good faith act of 
interpretation is receptive and non-instrumental.  These points may 
best be established through hypothetical examples involving an 
ordinary speech act. 
Hypothetical # 1:  Imagine you are a mother with a teenage son.  
You leave a note for the teenager that says:  “Instructions for 
Grandpa’s Birthday Party:  1. Get a haircut before the party.  2. Wear 
that new suit I bought you.  3. Let’s do this party the ‘family way.’”  If 
your teenager is to interpret your command in good faith, what tools 
would you expect him to use?  At a minimum, you would probably 
expect the teenager to determine its semantic content (the meaning 
of “birthday,” “party,” “haircut,” “suit,” etc.) and its structural and 
grammatical relationships (the haircut should come before the 
birthday party, etc.).  You would probably also expect him to take into 
account factors such as history and purpose, particularly when 
dealing with the broadly worded third instruction.  You would expect 
him to remember that in the past, when he was cheerful and loving 
and open with others, you congratulated him on acting in the “family 
way,” and that when he has been petulant or disagreeable, you have 
given him the admonition:  “That’s not the family way.”  Finally, you 
would expect him to understand that the purpose of the instructions 
is to make for a pleasant birthday party for Grandpa and that you 
have decided that a cheerful, loving, and open grandson with short 
hair and a suit is likely to make for such a party.  Notice that the 
teenager’s expected act of good-faith interpretation is receptive and 
non-instrumental.  You expect that your teenager will use a 
combination of background knowledge and linguistic tools to 
understand the meaning you have transmitted through your message. 
Hypothetical # 2:  Now imagine that the teenager only reads 
instruction number three.  He shows up at the party in long hair and 
a t-shirt, but is cheerful, loving, and open.  He is not purposefully 
defying instructions one and two; he simply did not read them.  
Imagine further that the party turns out to be a pleasant one, so your 
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overall purpose is fulfilled.  Did the teenager adequately interpret 
your note?  He understood your purpose and fulfilled it.  But he did 
not fulfill your purpose in the manner in which you instructed him, 
because he never discerned the meaning of instructions one and two.  
Although you are relieved that the party went well, you are likely to 
have a “talk” with your son afterwards. 
Hypothetical # 3:  Now imagine that the teenager reads all three 
instructions and understands the meaning you intended to 
communicate, but he is unhappy about instructions one and two.  He 
thinks to himself, “Mom doesn’t understand today’s fashion!  If I get 
a short haircut, my friends will tease me and I’ll never get a date.”  He 
may also have thoughts like, “The party will be no fun if I follow 
instructions one and two,” and “Why should I be bound by the desires 
of a couple of old people who have already lived their lives?”  Finally, 
imagine that he thinks, “I am going to focus on the overall purpose of 
the party.  It will be a lot more pleasant if I follow instruction three 
but treat instructions one and two as optional.”  As in hypothetical # 
2, he shows up in long hair and a t-shirt but acts cheerfully and 
lovingly, and the party goes well.  Has the teenager adequately 
interpreted your note?  He understood the semantic content of it, 
and in this sense did better than the teenager in hypothetical #2.  But 
at the same time, he replaced the note’s meaning with its purpose.  
He also acted instrumentally, allowing his own concerns to alter his 
reading of the note’s meaning.  Finally, he rejected your authority 
as a speaker, declaring to himself that he should not be bound by 
your first two instructions.  In this case, the teenager’s act of 
interpretation looks more like an act of defiance because his 
reading of the note is creative and instrumental rather than 
receptive and non-instrumental. 
Although the teenager may not appropriately be creative and 
instrumental in interpreting his mother’s request, he can certainly be 
creative and instrumental in deciding how to implement it.  For 
example, when he tells the barber what kind of haircut he wants, he 
can in good faith try to strike a balance between his grandfather’s 
desire that the hair be “short” and his own desire that it not be “too 
short.”  Obviously, there is some risk of error—and if he gets the 
balance wrong his mother will not be happy with him.  But the 
disagreement will be over the best way to strike a balance among 
competing interests, not over whether it was appropriate for the 
teenager to consider his own interests at all.  In short, it will be a 
disagreement over implementation, not interpretation. 
STINNEFORD.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2014  3:52 PM 
464 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:437 
B. Do the Miranda Rules Implement Constitutional Meaning? 
As described above, Mitchell Berman has argued that the Miranda 
rules may properly be understood as rules for implementing the 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination in the context of custodial interrogation.120  Berman 
argues that the Miranda Court interpreted “compelled” to mean the 
use of offensive police tactics that are inconsistent with the suspect’s 
personal dignity.121  Because it is difficult for a court to discern 
whether compulsion actually occurred during custodial 
interrogation, the Miranda Court decided to use implementation 
rules (the warning and waiver requirements) that would reduce the 
likelihood that compulsion would occur in the first place.122 
The only problem with Professor Berman’s reading of Miranda is 
that it is counterfactual.  In reality, like the teenager in 
hypothetical #2, above, the Miranda Court never interpreted the 
meaning of the term “compelled.”123  Therefore the Court did not 
use the Miranda rules to implement constitutional meaning, but as a 
substitute for constitutional meaning.  The interpretive emptiness 
at the heart of Miranda goes a long way toward explaining the 
dysfunction that has been associated with that case almost from 
the moment it was decided. 
As detailed more fully below, the Miranda Court flirted with at least 
three possible definitions of “compelled”:  (1) involuntary; (2) 
resulting from improper pressure or trickery; or (3) caused by 
custodial interrogation, regardless of whether improper pressure was 
employed.  It ultimately chose none of these definitions. 
A holding that “compelled” means the same thing as “involuntary” 
would have made Miranda an extension of the Court’s long line of 
due process voluntariness cases.  In these cases, the Supreme Court 
held that it violates the Due Process Clause to use involuntary 
confessions as evidence in a criminal case.124  The Court considered a 
                                                          
 120. Supra Part II.B.2. 
 121. Supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
 122. Supra notes 82–89 and accompanying text. 
 123. For this reason, the Miranda Court’s interpretation of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination has always been notoriously difficult to nail down.  
See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective:  The Right To 
Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2629 (1996) (“No one really knows what 
Miranda means.”). 
 124. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433–34 (2000) (“[F]or the 
middle third of the 20th century our cases based the rule against admitting coerced 
confessions primarily, if not exclusively, on notions of due process.  We applied the 
due process voluntariness test in some 30 different cases decided during [that] 
era . . . .” (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary 
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confession involuntary if the police had obtained it by “overbearing 
the will” of the defendant.125  These cases focused both on the 
offensive nature of the police conduct and the perceived strength or 
weakness of the defendant’s will.126  In cases in which the defendant 
was perceived as relatively strong and impervious to police pressure, 
the Court might admit the confession even if the police engaged in 
wrongful and even illegal conduct.127  Conversely, where the 
defendant was perceived as relatively weak and vulnerable, the 
confession might be excluded even though the level of pressure and 
trickery was relatively low.128 
The Miranda Court did use language that sometimes implied that 
“compelled” and “involuntary” are synonyms.129  But at the same time, 
the Court explicitly denied that the two terms mean the same thing, 
holding that a confession obtained through custodial interrogation 
                                                          
Confession Rule:  Toward a Workable Test for Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 
CALIF. L. REV. 465, 489–90 (2005) (describing the development of the due process 
voluntariness test). 
 125. See, e.g., Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225 (“The ultimate test remains . . . the test of 
voluntariness.  Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained 
choice by its maker?  If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him.  If 
it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination 
critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process.” (quoting Culombe 
v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) (plurality opinion))). 
 126. See id. at 225–26. 
 127. See, e.g., Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 240 (1941) (determining that 
prolonged interrogation of a prisoner involving sleep deprivation, at least one 
assault, and denial of a request for counsel was illegal but did not constitute an 
“infringement of due process” because these actions were not the cause of the 
defendant’s decision to confess). 
 128. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 322–23 (1959) (holding that an 
eight-hour interrogation involving some sleep deprivation and trickery violated due 
process because the defendant was poorly educated, emotionally unstable, and 
generally vulnerable).  Because the voluntariness analysis focused the Court’s 
attention on largely unknowable questions of free will, it was notoriously 
unpredictable in practice and was not considered an adequate means of controlling 
police misconduct.  See, e.g., YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS:  
ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 25 (1980) (arguing that the Court should “scrap the 
‘voluntariness’ terminology altogether”); Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, 
and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859, 863 (1979) (describing “the intolerable 
uncertainty . . . of the due process voluntariness doctrine”); George C. Thomas III & 
Marshall D. Bilder, Aristotle’s Paradox and the Self-Incrimination Puzzle, 82 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 245 & n.14 (1991) (describing the difficulty of applying 
the prohibition against involuntary confessions and citing numerous sources to 
same effect). 
 129. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (noting that the Fifth 
Amendment prohibits the government from using “the cruel, simple expedient of 
compelling [a confession] from [the suspect’s] own mouth,” and that “the privilege 
is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right ‘to remain silent unless he 
chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will’” (quoting Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964))); see also id. at 467 (stating that custodial interrogation 
involves “in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains 
inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to 
resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely”). 
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could violate the Fifth Amendment even if it would be considered 
voluntary under the Due Process Clause.130  Although the concern 
about “compelled” self-incrimination arose from similar facts as 
the concern about “involuntary” confessions, the Miranda Court 
was reasonably clear that the one thing was not the same as the 
other.131 
The second possibility, which is similar to the one adopted by 
Professor Berman, is that the term “compelled” focuses solely on 
police conduct.  If the police obtain a confession using offensive 
techniques that are inconsistent with the suspect’s human dignity, 
they have “compelled” that confession.132  This approach differs from 
the “voluntariness” approach in that it focuses on police conduct and 
spares courts from making difficult inquiries into the question of the 
suspect’s free will. 
Once again, there are aspects of the Miranda opinion that support 
this reading of “compelled.”  The Court discussed the need to 
“eradicate” offensive police practices.133  It quoted with evident 
approval Bram v. United States,134 a case from 1897 that equated 
compulsion with the use of promises and threats to obtain a 
confession.135  Perhaps most importantly, the Miranda Court devoted 
a full seven pages describing techniques that “police manuals” 
advised officers to use in order to “persuade, trick, or cajole” the 
                                                          
 130. See id. at 457 (“In these cases, we might not find the defendants’ 
statements to have been involuntary in traditional terms.  Our concern for 
adequate safeguards to protect precious Fifth Amendment rights is, of course, 
not lessened in the slightest.”). 
 131. See id.; see also Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, supra note 43, at 443 
(“[C]ompulsion for self-incrimination purposes and involuntariness for due process 
purposes cannot mean the same thing.”). 
 132. Of the three definitions of “compulsion” that float through the Miranda 
opinion, this one may be the closest to the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
compulsion under the Fifth Amendment in the decades leading up to this case.  See 
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (“[Prosecutorial] comment on the 
refusal to testify is . . . a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional 
privilege.  It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly.”); Bram v. 
United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542–43 (1897) (asserting that confessions “must not be 
extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied 
promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence” (quoting 3 
WILLIAM OLDNALL RUSSELL ET AL., A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 478 
(Horace Smith & A.P. Perceval Keep eds., 6th ed. 1896))). 
 133. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 447 (“Unless a proper limitation upon custodial 
interrogation is achieved—such as these decisions will advance—there can be no 
assurance that practices of this nature will be eradicated in the foreseeable future.”). 
 134. 168 U.S. 532 (1897). 
 135. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461–62 (focusing on whether the interrogator used 
methods that “the law treats as legally sufficient to engender in the mind of the 
accused hope or fear in respect to the crime charged” (quoting Bram, 168 U.S. 
at 549)).   
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defendant into talking.136  The Court’s focus on these techniques 
implied that techniques involving pressure, trickery, promises, or 
threats constitute compulsion.  But the Miranda Court never actually 
held that such techniques constituted compulsion, and it never 
forbade their use.  Moreover, the Miranda Court strongly implied that 
the Fifth Amendment can be violated even if the police do not use 
pressure or trickery:  “Even without employing brutality, the ‘third 
degree’ or the specific stratagems [from police manuals], the very 
fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual 
liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals.”137  If techniques 
of improper pressure and trickery are neither necessary nor 
sufficient to violate the Fifth Amendment, they cannot be equated 
with compulsion. 
The final possible meaning of “compelled” in Miranda is simply 
“caused by custodial interrogation.”  This reading of “compelled” 
implies that it is unconstitutional for police to engage in custodial 
interrogation at all, even if they do not use improper pressure.138  
This reading is supported by the Court’s discussion of the Fifth 
Amendment as establishing a “right to a private enclave where [the 
suspect] may lead a private life” and as “requir[ing] the government 
to shoulder the entire load” in a criminal case and to “produce the 
evidence against [the defendant] by its own independent labors.”139  
This reading is also supported by the fact that the opinion repeatedly 
mentions a “right of silence” (as opposed to a right not to be 
compelled to speak) and a “privilege against self-incrimination” (as 
opposed to a privilege against compelled self-incrimination).140 
The Supreme Court did not choose this meaning for “compelled” 
either.  If the police engage in compulsion any time they ask 
questions of a suspect who is in custody, the logical response would 
be to forbid custodial interrogation altogether.  The Miranda Court 
did not do this.  Rather, the Court allowed custodial interrogation to 
continue so long as police followed the Court-prescribed “procedural 
safeguards” of warning and waiver.141 
                                                          
 136. Id. at 448–55. 
 137. Id. at 455. 
 138. This reading of Miranda is similar to the one offered by Stephen Schulhofer.  
See Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, supra note 43, at 447 (“The Court did not hold 
that a brief period of interrogation can involve compulsion.  The Court held that the 
briefest period of interrogation necessarily will involve compulsion.”).  . 
 139. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 140. Id. at 444. 
 141. See id. 
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The truth of the matter is that the Supreme Court in Miranda did 
not particularly care what the term “compelled” means.  The Court 
was interested in enforcing its own instrumental concerns, not those 
embodied in the constitutional text, and therefore, it used 
implementation as a substitute for interpretation.  For more than 
thirty years prior to Miranda, the Court had tried to find an effective 
way to regulate police interrogation, first through the Due Process 
Clause, then through the Fourth and Sixth Amendments, and finally 
through the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination.142  The Court did not like the fact that police 
sometimes used brutality or improper pressure.143  But it also did not 
like the fact that the process disadvantaged ignorant, weak, and poor 
defendants.144  The Court also disliked the fact that wealthy (often 
white) defendants with the money and presence of mind to hire an 
attorney tended to do better than poor (often black or Hispanic) 
defendants who did not.145  Some of these concerns revolved around 
the idea of compulsion, but some revolved around a more general 
concern for societal power disparities and fairness. 
For this reason, the Miranda Court was much more interested in 
the “procedural safeguards” it was creating than in interpreting the 
Constitution.  By requiring police to warn suspects of their right to 
silence, of the fact that their statements would be used against them, 
of their right to counsel, and of the fact that an attorney would be 
appointed if they were indigent, the Court sought to “level the 
playing field” not only between the suspect and the police, but 
between poor, ignorant suspects, and wealthy, knowledgeable ones.146  
The hope was that these warnings would not only reduce the 
incidence of police brutality and improper pressure, but would make 
the system fairer generally. 
This was a noble goal, and one that was in some ways achieved.  But 
it was not built on an interpretation of the term “compelled.”  This 
reality has had several serious effects on Miranda’s legacy. 
                                                          
 142. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 
866–87 (1981) (book review) (describing the Supreme Court’s efforts to regulate 
police interrogation through the Due Process Clause and the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendments). 
 143. See George C. Thomas III, The End of the Road for Miranda v. Arizona?:  On the 
History and Future of Rules for Police Interrogation, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2000) 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s concern about coercive police tactics). 
 144. See id. at 3, 6 (elaborating upon the Supreme Court’s desire to create a level 
playing field in the context of interrogation). 
 145. See id. at 2–3 (characterizing the Miranda Court as intending to make the most 
vulnerable suspects “more equal to police officers (and more affluent suspects)”). 
 146. Id. at 3. 
STINNEFORD.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2014  3:52 PM 
2013] THE ILLUSORY EIGHTH AMENDMENT 469 
C. Miranda’s Legacy 
The Miranda Court’s decision to create implementation rules to 
prevent compelled self-incrimination without first interpreting the 
term “compelled” has had several consequences.  First and most 
importantly, it is impossible to discern the Miranda rules’ relationship 
to constitutional meaning, and therefore it is impossible to tell 
whether they over-enforce, under-enforce, or perfectly enforce the 
Constitution.147  One cannot make such a determination without 
knowing the meaning of the constitutional provisions the rules are 
meant to enforce.148 
Second, the Miranda rules create the (very likely false) appearance 
of over-enforcement or prophylaxis.  When the Court tells the police 
that they are constitutionally bound to do (or to not do) something 
but makes little effort to demonstrate why the Constitution demands 
this, the Court’s order is bound to appear arbitrary and 
overreaching.149  This is the fundamental reason judges write 
opinions:  to justify their orders by showing how they flow from 
interpreted constitutional or statutory meaning.  Although the 
Miranda Court described many aspects of custodial interrogation that 
it disliked or considered pernicious, it never tied these back to the 
meaning of “compelled.”150  As a result, the decision appeared to 
many to be nothing more than a judicial fiat. 
When the Court uses what appears to be an over-enforcing or 
prophylactic decision rule, this is likely to diminish the role of other 
constitutional actors in implementing the Constitution in at least two 
ways.  First, the perception that implementation rules over-enforce 
the Constitution is likely to generate hostility from the constitutional 
actors those rules govern to the extent that such rules imply that the 
actors they govern are either incompetent or biased against the 
constitutional provision the rules are meant to enforce.151  As a result, 
                                                          
 147. Cf. Roosevelt, supra note 56, at 1711–12 (arguing that confusion between 
“decision rules” and “operative propositions” tends to “warp[]” constitutional doctrine. 
 148. See supra Part II.A. 
 149. Cf. Roosevelt, supra note 56, at 1717 (“When the Court . . . comes to believe 
that the meaning of the Constitution is exhaustively specified by a list of what judges 
will uphold or strike down[,] it denies nonjudicial actors their appropriate role in 
implementing the Constitution.”). 
 150. See supra Part II.B. 
 151. For example, Richard Leo cited several studies of police attitudes in the years 
after Miranda was decided indicating that police “resented” the Miranda rules 
because they believed these rules were “artificial, unnecessary and generally 
impugning of police integrity” and “undermin[ed] the authoritativeness of their 
relations with criminal suspects.”  Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda 
in the Twenty-First Century, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1003, 1003 n.14 (2001) (citing NEIL 
A. MILNER, THE COURT AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT:  THE IMPACT OF MIRANDA 219 
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such actors are likely to do the minimum necessary to comply with 
the rules and to look for ways to get around them.152  The post-
Miranda history of custodial interrogation is replete with examples of 
such police conduct.153  The fact that the Supreme Court has been 
willing to approve or encourage many of these efforts to get around 
or minimize the effect of Miranda indicates that the Court itself seems 
to believe that Miranda went too far.154 
More seriously, the appearance that rules are prophylactic tends to 
make the constitutional provision the rules are meant to enforce 
disappear.  If everyone (including the police and the courts) believes 
that compliance with the rules ensures compliance with the 
Constitution, then compliance with the rules will be the only question 
that gets adjudicated.155  As Professor Kermit Roosevelt III has shown, 
                                                          
(1971); Otis H. Stephens et al., Law Enforcement and the Supreme Court:  Police 
Perceptions of the Miranda Requirements, 39 TENN. L. REV. 407, 423 (1972); Michael 
Wald et al., Project, Interrogations in New Haven:  The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 
1519, 1610–11 (1967)). 
 152. See Leo, supra note 151, at 1016. 
 153. See id. at 1010 (“[I]n some jurisdictions police are systematically trained to 
violate Miranda by questioning “outside Miranda” (i.e., by continuing to question 
suspects who have invoked the right to counsel or the right to remain silent)”); see 
also id. at 1016 (“[P]olice have devised multiple strategies to avoid, circumvent, 
nullify or simply violate Miranda and its invocation rules in their pursuit of 
confession evidence.”); Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda:  
Modern Interrogators’ Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. 
L. REV. 397, 447–50 (1999) (describing police techniques for getting around 
difficulties posed by Miranda requirements); Charles D. Weisselberg, In the 
Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1121, 1135–54 (2001) (describing 
phenomenon of police questioning “outside Miranda” and arguing that this 
practice should decrease after Miranda’s reaffirmation in Dickerson); Weisselberg, 
Saving Miranda, supra note 46, at 112, 177–88 (arguing that the Supreme Court 
should “re-consitutionalize” Miranda and expand the exclusionary rule associated 
with Miranda violations). 
 154. See, e.g., United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 633–34 (2004) (plurality 
opinion) (finding that physical evidence obtained as the result of a Miranda 
violation, unlike the physical fruits of an involuntary confession, can be introduced 
as evidence at trial); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985) (“[A] suspect who 
has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled 
from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda 
warnings.”); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225–26 (1971) (holding that 
statements obtained in violation of Miranda, unlike statements found involuntary 
under the Due Process Clause, can be used to impeach a defendant at trial).  It has 
been argued that cases like these have “created the incentive” for the police to evade 
the restrictions imposed by Miranda.  See Leo, supra note 151, at 1020.  However, the 
Court has limited police officers’ ability to do so.  See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 
600, 604, 616 n.7 (2004) (plurality opinion) (holding that a Miranda waiver is 
ineffective where the post-warning statement is obtained as part of a deliberate two-
step process involving unwarned interrogation and confession followed immediately 
by warnings, waiver, and a reiteration of the interrogation and confession). 
 155. See Leo, supra note 151, at 1022 (noting that because police can avoid 
suppression of evidence simply by complying with the Miranda rules, “Miranda . . . 
reduces the pressure on police” to eliminate coercive or dishonest interrogation 
practices “on their own initiative”); see also Martin H. Belsky, Living with Miranda:  A 
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once this occurs, the rules themselves become calcified, freezing and 
often shrinking the meaning of the Constitution.156 
This problem is particularly acute when implementation rules are 
used as a substitute for constitutional interpretation.  When the Court 
fails to discern the meaning of a constitutional right before devising 
implementation rules, there is no way to tell whether police conduct 
that complies with the rules actually violates the Constitution.157  
Once the rules are complied with, the appearance of prophylaxis is 
replaced by the reality of deference.  The police can do what they 
want and are unlikely to be found to have violated the Constitution. 
Recall that in Miranda, the Court flirted with the idea that certain 
kinds of pressure tactics and trickery might constitute compulsion, 
but never quite reached this conclusion.158  The Court also flirted 
with the idea that custodial interrogation itself might constitute 
compulsion because of the pressures associated with custodial 
interrogation, but never quite reached this conclusion.159  Because 
the Court never held that these practices constituted compulsion 
(and indeed, never determined what “compelled” means), many of 
the practices disliked by the Miranda Court are still used today.160  As 
long as the police give the requisite warnings and obtain the requisite 
waiver, they can still keep the defendant alone in a room and 
question him for hours, using psychological pressure and trickery to 
induce a confession.161 
                                                          
Reply to Professor Grano, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 127, 146 (1994) (arguing that Miranda masks 
the decreasing protection given to individuals in the criminal justice system and 
reduces pressure to reform police practices); Godsey, supra note 124, at 534 
(imagining a set of post-Miranda police interrogation instructions that tell the officer, 
“[i]n practice, once you give Miranda warnings, courts presume the confession will 
be voluntary, so you can sometimes get away with applying a lot of pressure as long as 
it is not really outrageous”). 
 156. Roosevelt, supra note 56, at 1651, 1692–93. 
 157. See supra Part II.A. 
 158. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 447–55 (1966); supra Part II.B; see also 
Leo, supra note 151, at 1015 (“Miranda does not restrict deceptive or suggestive 
police tactics, manipulative interrogation strategies, hostile or overbearing 
questioning styles, lengthy confinement, or any of the inherently stressful conditions 
of modern accusatorial interrogation that may lead the suspect to confess.”). 
 159. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460; supra Part II.B. 
 160. See Belsky, supra note 155, at 127 (“Interviews, questioning, and 
interrogations are conducted almost exactly as they had been before Miranda, except 
for the addition of warning cards in formal settings.”); Leo, supra note 151, at 1021 
(“American police continue to use the same psychological methods of persuasion, 
manipulation, and deception that the Warren Court roundly criticized in Miranda.”); 
Patrick A. Malone, “You Have the Right To Remain Silent”:  Miranda After Twenty Years, 
55 AM. SCHOLAR 367, 367 (1986) (same). 
 161. See Peter Arenella, Miranda Stories, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 375, 387 (1997) 
(“Miranda has actually legitimated moderately coercive interrogation practices.”); 
Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, Was It Overruled, or Is It Irrelevant?, 10 ST. THOMAS L. 
REV. 461, 478 (1998) (arguing that the Miranda warnings give police “a potent 
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Moreover, the evidence regarding post-Miranda interrogation 
demonstrates three important facts:  First, after receiving their 
Miranda warnings, the overwhelming majority of suspects waive their 
Miranda rights.162  Second, once a person waives his Miranda rights, 
he is unlikely to invoke them if the police start ratcheting up the 
pressure.163  Third, once a person waives his Miranda rights, courts 
are unlikely to find that any subsequent confession is involuntary, 
even if the police use pressure tactics that would have resulted in 
findings of due process violations prior to Miranda.164  These facts 
indicate that once the police give the Miranda warnings and obtain 
a waiver, they can engage in conduct that actually violates the 
Constitution, and neither the defendant nor the court is likely to 
                                                          
weapon to sanitize otherwise questionable confessions”); Leo, supra note 151, at 1022 
(“Miranda has helped the police shield themselves from evidentiary challenges, 
rendering admissible otherwise questionable and/or involuntary confessions.”); 
Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure To Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Practices, 99 MICH. 
L. REV. 1211, 1215 (2001) (arguing that police interrogators use techniques that 
place them “so overwhelmingly in control of the interrogation” that suspects have 
little real opportunity to exercise their rights). 
 162. See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s:  An 
Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 860 (1996) (finding that 
suspects waive their rights about 83% of the time); Leo, supra note 151, at 1009 
(“[P]olice appear to elicit waivers from suspects in roughly 80% of their 
interrogations . . . .”).  See generally Malone, supra note 160, at 368 (“Miranda warnings 
have little or no effect on a suspect’s propensity to talk. . . .  Next to the warning label 
on cigarette packs, Miranda is the most widely ignored piece of official advice in our 
society.”). 
 163. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 162, at 859–60 (demonstrating that, in a 
study of 129 interrogations, there were five mid-interrogation invocations out of the 
108 suspects who initially waived their rights); Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda 
Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 653 (1996) (finding that, in a study of 
182 interrogations, only two of the 146 suspects who did not initially invoke their 
Miranda rights changed their mind and chose to invoke these rights mid-
interrogation); William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 988 (2001) 
(observing that very few people invoke Miranda rights after questioning has begun, 
even in response to coercive interrogation tactics). 
 164. See Garcia, supra note 161, at 475–76, 478 (asserting that Miranda warnings 
provide law enforcement with a “potent weapon to sanitize otherwise questionable 
confessions”); Leo, supra note 151, at 1025–26 (arguing that Miranda has not 
deterred the police from using psychological pressure and trickery, but has “lull[ed] 
judges into admitting confessions with little inquiry into voluntariness”); Malone, 
supra note 160, at 377–79 (arguing that after Miranda, the pertinent inquiry shifted 
from whether a suspect’s confession was voluntarily given to whether he voluntarily 
waived his Miranda rights); Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. 
REV. 673, 744–45 (1992) (“The warning-and-waiver ritual that is at Miranda’s core 
served to insulate the resulting confessions from claims that they were coerced or 
involuntary.”); White, supra note 161, at 1220 (“A finding that the police have 
properly informed the suspect of his Miranda rights . . . often has the effect of 
minimizing or eliminating the scrutiny applied to post-waiver interrogation 
practices.”).  See generally Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) 
(noting that “[c]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a 
self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that the law 
enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.” (quoting 
(Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984))). 
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stop them.  Because the interpretive heart of Miranda is empty, 
persons subjected to custodial interrogation are given an 
appearance of overprotection coupled with what is, for many, a 
reality of under-protection. 
III. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS:  IMPLEMENTATION                
WITHOUT INTERPRETATION 
The Supreme Court’s current approach to excessive punishments 
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is similar to its 
approach to compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth 
Amendment.  In both cases, the Court has failed or refused to 
interpret a key constitutional term or concept—“compelled” under 
the Fifth Amendment; both “unusual” and “excessive” under the 
Eighth.  In both cases, the Court has devised a set of implementation 
rules that are driven by concerns largely independent of the meaning 
of the constitutional provision.  Finally, in both cases, the Court’s 
approach has created a dysfunctional combination of interbranch 
resistance and judicial passivity. 
The story of the “excessive punishment” implementation rules is 
more complex than the story of the Miranda rules.  Whereas the 
Miranda Court failed to interpret an important constitutional term 
(“compelled”), the excessive punishment cases involve two 
interpretive failures.  The Supreme Court first failed to interpret the 
term “unusual,” then withdrew its traditional interpretation of 
“excessive.” Whereas Miranda created a single set of rules that apply 
in all cases involving custodial interrogation, the excessive 
punishment cases have created two sets of rules, some of which apply 
to cases of adult imprisonment and some of which apply to cases 
involving the death penalty and life sentences for juveniles. Finally, 
whereas the Miranda rules were driven by a set of complementary 
concerns (the desire to control police misconduct and level the 
playing field among suspects), the excessive punishment rules are 
driven by opposing concerns.  Rules governing adult 
imprisonment are driven by a desire to avoid interference with 
legislative power, while rules governing death penalty and juvenile 
life imprisonment cases are driven by a desire to limit punishment 
practices the Supreme Court considers pernicious (although not 
necessarily excessive).  
The Supreme Court’s initial failure to interpret the term “unusual” 
led to a series of implementation problems, which then led to 
additional failures of interpretation and implementation.  This 
cascading series of failures has resulted in a Cruel and Unusual 
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Punishments Clause jurisprudence that serves as a symbol of 
judicial overreaching, despite the fact that it is vastly under-
protective in reality. 
A. Partial Interpretive Failure:  “Unusual” and “Excessive” 
Since at least the 1950s, the Supreme Court has refused to 
interpret the term “unusual” in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause.  In Trop v. Dulles,165 a plurality of the Court stated that it was 
uncertain whether the word “unusual” had any independent 
meaning.166  The plurality ultimately concluded, however, that the 
question was unimportant because the Court’s task was “simply [to] 
examine[] the particular punishment involved in light of the basic 
prohibition against inhuman treatment, without regard to any 
subtleties of meaning that might be latent in the word ‘unusual.’”167  
Although individual justices have occasionally taken a stab at 
interpreting the term,168 the Supreme Court as a whole continues, 
in line with Trop, to ignore it.  The Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause has effectively been transformed into the “Cruel 
Punishments Clause.” 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that a punishment may be 
cruel by virtue of being excessive.169  An excessive punishment differs 
from “barbaric” or “inherently cruel” methods of punishment in that 
it is not unacceptably harsh in itself, but is too harsh in relation to its 
                                                          
 165. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
 166. Id. at 100 n.32 (plurality opinion). 
 167. Id.  While the plurality acknowledged that “unusual” might mean “different 
from that which is generally done,” id., it ignored that possible meaning in Trop and 
in subsequent cases. 
 168. For example, in Furman v. Georgia, Justice Stewart implied that the term 
applied to punishments that were “wantonly and . . . freakishly imposed” and thus 
comparable to being “struck by lightning.”  408 U.S. 238, 309–10 (1972) (Stewart, J., 
concurring) (per curiam).  In the same case, Justice Douglas opined that “unusual” 
means “discriminatory,” stating, “It would seem to be incontestable that the death 
penalty inflicted on one defendant is ‘unusual’ if it discriminates against him by 
reason of his race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a 
procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices.”  Id. at 242 
(Douglas, J., concurring). 
 169. For nearly 150 years, the Supreme Court has implicitly recognized that 
excessiveness is a form of unconstitutional cruelty.  In Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. 
(5 Wall.) 475, 479–80 (1866), Pervear was sentenced to a fine and a short prison 
term for operating an illegal liquor store.  He argued that this punishment was cruel 
and unusual because it was excessive.  Id. at 479.  The Supreme Court declined to 
decide the case because the Eighth Amendment did not apply to the states, but 
stated in dicta that Pervear would lose on the merits, not because the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause did not prohibit excessive punishments, but because 
Pervear’s punishment was not excessive.  Id. at 480. 
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justification in a given case.170  Traditionally, the Supreme Court has 
tied the concept of “excessiveness” to the offender’s moral culpability 
for committing the offense.171  For example, a life sentence would 
likely be an unconstitutionally excessive punishment for a minor 
offense like a parking violation, because such offenses do not 
require any showing of culpability.172  On the other hand, a life 
sentence might not be excessive for a major offense like murder, 
                                                          
 170. See Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth 
Amendment:  “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 588–97 (2005) 
(describing the concept of proportionality in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence). 
 171. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 834 (1988) (plurality 
opinion) (“It is generally agreed ‘that punishment should be directly related to the 
personal culpability of the criminal defendant.’” (quoting California v. Brown, 479 
U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring))); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 
349, 366–67 (1910) (“Such penalties for such offenses amaze those who . . . believe 
that it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and 
proportioned to offense.”).  The Court sometimes divides the culpability analysis into 
two separate categories:  “culpability,” meaning the blameworthiness of the 
offender’s state of mind, and “harm,” meaning the injury caused or threatened by 
the crime.  These two categories cannot be separated from each other in reality, 
however, because the blameworthiness of the offender’s state of mind depends on 
the gravity of the harm he intends, knowingly risks, or fails to foresee.   
The Supreme Court has described its culpability analysis in various ways.  See, e.g., 
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983) (stating that the severity of the punishment 
should be compared to the gravity of the offense “made in light of the harm caused 
or threatened to the victim or society, and the culpability of the offender”); Enmund 
v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (“It is fundamental that ‘causing harm 
intentionally must be punished more severely than causing the same harm 
unintentionally.’” (quoting H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY:  ESSAYS IN 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 162 (1968))); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 (1980) 
(“This Court has on occasion stated that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
imposition of a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the 
crime.”); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“Rape is 
without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral depravity and 
of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with murder, 
which does involve the unjustified taking of human life.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion) (characterizing the death penalty as an “extreme 
sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes”); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 
660, 667 (1962) (holding that it is unconstitutional to punish a person for being a 
narcotics addict because addiction is an illness, and noting that “[e]ven one day in 
prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a 
common cold”); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion) (“Fines, 
imprisonment and even execution may be imposed depending upon the enormity of 
the crime.”); O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 340 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the state’s power to punish is limited by the severity of the crime, and 
that “[t]he state may . . . make the drinking of one drop of liquor an offense to be 
punished by imprisonment, but it would be an unheard-of cruelty if it should count 
the drops in a single glass and make thereby a thousand offenses, and thus extend 
the punishment for drinking the single glass of liquor to an imprisonment of almost 
indefinite duration”). 
 172. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 n.11 (agreeing that the proportionality principal 
would come into play in this situation). 
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because murder convictions generally require proof of a high level 
of culpability.173 
B. Implementation Failures:  Evolving Standards and                  
Independent Judgment 
If a punishment is unconstitutionally excessive when it is too harsh 
in relation to the offender’s moral culpability, we are left with a 
seemingly insoluble implementation problem.  Punishment, by 
definition, involves the intentional infliction of pain.174  How do we 
determine whether a given infliction of pain is too harsh?  We need 
some baseline—some implementation rule—to help us sort cruel 
from non-cruel punishments reliably. 
Over the past half-century, the Supreme Court has vacillated 
between various possible baselines, including most prominently the 
“evolving standards of decency” test, under which the Court asks 
whether a given punishment violates a current societal moral 
consensus, and the Court’s own “independent judgment,” under 
which the Court asks whether the Court itself considers a punishment 
too cruel, irrespective of any societal consensus.175 
In some early death penalty cases, decided in the 1970s and 1980s, 
these two tests seemed to work well together.  The Supreme Court 
decided that the death penalty was permissible for intentional 
murder because this punishment was imposed in a large number of 
jurisdictions, indicating that it comported with current standards of 
decency, and because the punishment was proportionate to the crime 
in the Court’s own judgment.176  The Court struck down the death 
penalty for simple rape177 and for felony murder where the defendant 
neither intended nor directly caused the death because most states 
                                                          
 173. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (plurality opinion) (upholding the 
constitutionality of a statute authorizing the death penalty for murder). 
 174. For example, the Oxford English Dictionary defines “punish” as “cause (an 
offender) to suffer for an offence.”  Punish Definition, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/154671?redirectedFrom=punish#eid (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2013). 
 175. Compare Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173–74 (plurality opinion) (using both “evolving 
standards of decency” and the Court’s own judgment to determine whether a 
punishment is cruel and unusual), with Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021, 
2026 (2010) (using both “evolving standards of decency” and the Court’s own 
judgment, but relying much more heavily on the latter), and Stanford v. Kentucky, 
492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989) (using “evolving standards of decency” but pointedly 
refusing to use the Court’s own judgment as part of the test for unconstitutionality).  
 176. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 174, 179–80 (plurality opinion). 
 177. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (plurality opinion) (expressing 
the opinion that rapists are not as culpable as murderers). 
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had eliminated this punishment and because the death penalty was 
disproportionate in the Court’s own judgment.178 
Outside the death penalty context, however, the Supreme Court 
found itself unable to implement the prohibition of excessive 
punishments consistently and effectively.179  One reason the Court 
had relatively little difficulty deciding the death penalty cases was 
that they involved the harshest punishment imposed in the United 
States.  Because this punishment was at the highest end of the 
harshness scale, it was relatively easy for the Court to conclude that 
it should only be imposed for those crimes, like murder, that are at 
the highest end of the culpability scale.180  But what about 
punishments less harsh than death and crimes less serious than 
murder?  To determine whether such punishments are excessive 
for such crimes, the Court would need to find some reliable way to 
determine where a given crime falls on the culpability scale 
(sometimes called “ordinal proportionality”) and whether there is 
a permissible fit between the crime and the punishment, 
(sometimes called “cardinal proportionality”).181 
The difficulty of using either “evolving standards of decency” or 
“independent judgment” to determine questions of ordinal and 
cardinal proportionality was demonstrated in two cases decided in 
the early 1980s, Rummel v. Estelle182 and Solem v. Helm.183  The two cases 
involved virtually identical facts.  Rummel was a recidivist sentenced 
to life imprisonment after being convicted of obtaining $120.75 by 
false pretenses.184  Helm was a recidivist who received a life sentence 
with no possibility of parole for uttering a no account check worth 
$100.00.185  The similarities end there, however, for Rummel’s 
                                                          
 178. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789, 797–98 (1982) (“It is fundamental that 
causing harm intentionally must be punished more severely than causing the same 
harm unintentionally.  Enmund did not kill or intend to kill and thus his culpability 
is plainly different from that of the robbers who killed.” (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 179. Compare, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 281, 303 (1983) (finding a 
constitutional violation based on facts that were nearly identical to those presented 
in Rummel—life imprisonment after being convicted of uttering a “no account” check 
for $100 following six nonviolent felony convictions), with Rummel v. Estelle, 445 
U.S. 263, 265–66 (1980) (holding that imposing a life sentence on a recidivist 
convicted of fraudulently obtaining a little over one hundred dollars did not violate 
the Constitution).  These cases are discussed more fully below.  Infra notes 182–204. 
 180. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (plurality opinion) (describing the death 
penalty as “an extreme sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes”). 
 181. See, e.g., ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 18–19 (1993). 
 182. 445 U.S. 263 (1980). 
 183. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
 184. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 275–76. 
 185. Helm, 463 U.S. at 281–82. 
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sentence was upheld186 while Helm’s was declared unconstitutional.187  
As these results imply, the opinions in Rummel and Helm differed 
drastically as to whether a prison sentence could be judged excessive 
under either the evolving standards of decency or the independent 
judgment baseline. 
According to the Rummel Court, the evolving standards of decency 
test could not be relied upon to determine questions of ordinal or 
cardinal proportionality because state practice was too varied to show 
a societal consensus.188  Some states treated crimes like Rummel’s as 
felonies, some did not;189 some treated recidivism more seriously than 
others.190  It was not enough to say that Rummel’s punishment was 
harsher than it would be in any other state, because in a federalist 
system designed to permit varied state practice, “some State will 
always bear the distinction of treating particular offenders more 
severely than any other State.”191 
The Rummel Court also rejected the idea that courts could 
determine questions of ordinal and cardinal proportionality by 
exercising their own independent judgment.192  Penologists, who 
make their livings studying punishment practices, disagreed 
among themselves as to the amount of punishment that was 
appropriate for a given crime.193  If the experts could not reach a 
definitive conclusion as to this issue, neither could the courts—
particularly without a “neutral principle of adjudication” that 
would make excessiveness determinations more than a mere 
exercise of judicial will.194 
In Solem v. Helm, decided just three years after Rummel, the 
Supreme Court came to precisely the opposite conclusion regarding 
the workability of the “independent judgment” and “evolving 
standards of decency” baselines.195 
In contrast to Rummel, the Helm Court held that judges were 
capable of using their independent judgment to determine questions 
of ordinal proportionality.196  Judges could consider traditional 
                                                          
 186. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 265. 
 187. Helm, 463 U.S. at 284. 
 188. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 281–82. 
 189. Id. at 269 n.9 (listing the thirty-five other states that punish comparable 
crimes as felonies). 
 190. Id. at 279–82. 
 191. Id. at 282. 
 192. Id. at 274–75. 
 193. Id. at 283. 
 194. Id. at 267. 
 195. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983).  
 196. Id. (arguing that “courts are competent to judge the gravity of an offense, at 
least on a relative scale”).  
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factors such as actual or threatened harm, the defendant’s intent and 
motive, and the defendant’s character (including his history of 
recidivism).197  The Helm Court recognized, on the other hand, that 
it is more difficult to determine questions of cardinal 
proportionality.198  Although it is relatively clear that a crime like 
burglary is less serious than murder and more serious than simple 
larceny, it is harder to do the “line-drawing” necessary to 
determine whether a twenty-five-year sentence for burglary is 
unconstitutionally excessive.199 
This is where the evolving standards of decency test came in.  The 
Helm Court held that courts could determine questions of cardinal 
proportionality by comparing the sentence in a given case to 
sentences imposed for more serious crimes in the same jurisdiction 
and for the same crime in other jurisdictions.200  If a relatively minor 
crime is being punished with greater severity than more serious 
crimes in the same jurisdiction, this would be an indication that the 
punishment is unconstitutionally excessive.201  Similarly, if the crime 
is being punished more severely than the same crime is punished 
in other jurisdictions, this too indicates excessiveness.202  Because 
Solem’s life sentence was the harshest available under South 
Dakota law, and his punishment was harsher than punishments 
given for more serious crimes in South Dakota and for the same 
crime in other jurisdictions, the Supreme Court found it to be 
unconstitutionally excessive.203 
The Helm Court did not overturn Rummel, but distinguished it 
on the ground that Rummel had a chance at parole after twelve 
years, and therefore his sentence was significantly less severe than 
Helm’s.204  Thus the question of whether the Court’s baselines for 
measuring excessiveness could be effective over a broad range of 
cases remained unclear. 
The Supreme Court’s next two non-capital excessiveness cases 
demonstrated the almost infinite variety of ways in which questions 
about ordinal and cardinal proportionality could present themselves.  
Harmelin v. Michigan205 involved a first-time offender sentenced to life 
                                                          
 197. See id. at 292–96. 
 198. See id. at 294. 
 199. Id.  
 200. See id. at 291–92. 
 201. Id. at 291. 
 202. Id. at 291–92. 
 203. Id. at 302–03. 
 204. Id. at 297. 
 205. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
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in prison with no possibility of parole for possessing more than 650 
grams of cocaine.206  Harmelin faced the same sentence (life 
imprisonment with no possibility of parole) as Helm.  Was he more 
culpable or less culpable than Helm?  Possession of more than 30,000 
doses of cocaine207 is a much more serious crime than utterance of a 
no account check for $100.  But, on the other hand, Harmelin had 
no criminal record,208 and thus had not demonstrated the same level 
of commitment to a life of crime as had Helm.209  How do we sort out 
these conflicting factors?  Ewing v. California210 involved a recidivist 
sentenced to a term of twenty-five years to life for shoplifting three 
golf clubs worth about $1200.211  Ewing faced a sentence that was 
significantly harsher than Rummel’s but less harsh than Helm’s.  His 
crime was non-violent and involved a relatively small amount of 
money.  But the value of the property he took was more than ten 
times greater than the money taken by Helm, and his criminal history 
involved violence.212  How do we measure Ewing’s culpability, and 
how do we compare it to the severity of his sentence?  It was not 
clear to a majority of the justices in Harmelin and Ewing that the 
Court had the capacity to sort out these varying questions of 
ordinal and cardinal proportionality with the degree of certainty 
necessary to justify nullification of a legislative enactment, even 
with the assistance of the “evolving standards of decency” and 
“independent judgment” baselines. 
C. Cascading Failures Part 1—Withdrawn Interpretation 
In response to these seemingly insoluble implementation 
problems, the Supreme Court withdrew its traditional definition of 
excessive punishments.  In Harmelin v. Michigan, two Justices (Justice 
Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist) held that the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause contains no prohibition of excessive 
punishments.213  A controlling opinion written by Justice Kennedy 
announced that the Eighth Amendment contains a “narrow” 
                                                          
 206. Id. at 961 (plurality opinion). 
 207. Id. at 1002 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(noting that Harmelin possessed a quantity of cocaine with “a potential yield of 
between 32,500 and 65,000 doses”). 
 208. Id. at 994 (majority opinion). 
 209. See Helm, 463 U.S. at 279 (indicating that Helm had been convicted of six 
nonviolent felonies). 
 210. 538 U.S. 11 (2003). 
 211. Id. at 17–18, 20 (plurality opinion). 
 212. Id. at 18–19. 
 213. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) (plurality opinion) 
(asserting that “the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee”). 
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prohibition of “grossly disproportionate” punishments.214  This 
“narrow” prohibition was, in fact, conceptually empty.  Justice 
Kennedy’s Harmelin opinion abandoned the traditional tie between 
excessiveness and moral culpability, holding that “the Eighth 
Amendment does not mandate adoption of any one penological 
theory.”215  Legislatures are free, it declared, to make “fundamental 
choices” about the appropriate justification for punishment and to 
design the punishment to fit the choices the legislature has made.216  
Punishments would no longer be constitutionally limited by the 
offender’s moral culpability, but could be as harsh as the legislature 
deemed necessary to further goals of deterrence, incapacitation, 
rehabilitation, or any other legitimate government purpose. 
This approach to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
amounted to total deference to the legislature, not merely as to how 
to implement the prohibition of excessive punishments, but as to the 
meaning of excessiveness itself.217  As discussed above, the term 
“excessive” does not refer to the absolute harshness of a punishment, 
but to the punishment’s harshness in relation to its justification.218  By 
declaring that legislatures are free to use punishment to pursue any 
legitimate purpose, the Supreme Court effectively delegated to the 
legislature the power to define the meaning of “excessive.” 
                                                          
 214. Id. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
 215. Id. at 999. 
 216. Id. at 998. 
 217. The decision to defer to the legislature as to the meaning of a constitutional 
provision—particularly a constitutional provision designed to constrain legislative 
power—is exceedingly strange.  As Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), “[i]t is emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”  Deference is appropriate 
where another governmental actor has superior legal or epistemic authority 
concerning a given matter.  See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1061, 1072 (2008) (“[D]eference involves a decisionmaker following a 
determination made by some other individual or institution that it might not 
otherwise have reached had it decided the same question independently.”); Robert 
A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal 
Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 665 (2000) (“Judicial deference 
acknowledges that, based on the interpretation of another branch of government, a 
court might arrive at a conclusion different from one it would otherwise reach.”).  
The various state and federal legislatures appear to enjoy no practical or legal 
advantage over the Supreme Court in determining what the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause means. 
 218. See Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 70–74 (2005) 
(implying that punishments may differ depending on whether they are justified 
under a theory of rehabilitation, retribution, incapacitation, general or specific 
deterrence, denunciation, etc.); infra Part III.A. 
STINNEFORD.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2014  3:52 PM 
482 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:437 
D. Cascading Failures Part 2—Substitution of Implementation             
Rules for Interpretation 
When the Supreme Court fails to interpret a constitutional 
provision or concept, it can take one of two approaches to 
implementation.  It can refuse to adjudicate claims arising under that 
provision, either by declaring the issue nonjusticiable or by adopting 
implementation rules that are so deferential to the legislature or 
executive as to make litigation pointless.  Alternatively, the Court can 
adopt anti-deferential implementation rules that allow the Court to 
invalidate certain categories of government conduct without having 
to resort to constitutional interpretation.219  Because such rules are 
not built upon the interpreted meaning of the Constitution, however, 
they carry with them an appearance of arbitrariness and 
overreaching.  Very often, such rules further interests that are either 
unrelated or tangentially related to the constitutional provision or 
concept at issue. 
Since Harmelin, the Supreme Court has replaced constitutional 
interpretation with implementation rules.  Because the term 
“excessive” no longer has inherent constitutional meaning, the Court 
now employs categorical presumptions of constitutionality or 
unconstitutionality to resolve excessiveness claims under the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause. 
1. The presumption of constitutionality 
As discussed above, the Supreme Court traditionally interpreted 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to prohibit punishments 
that were excessive in light of the offender’s moral culpability.220  In 
Solem v. Helm, for example, the Court employed the evolving 
standards of decency test in conjunction with its own independent 
judgment to determine issues of ordinal and cardinal 
proportionality.221  In addition, the Helm Court announced a 
moderately deferential standard of review for legislatively authorized 
                                                          
 219. The one option that is not available when the Court fails to interpret the 
operative constitutional provision is a non-deferential standard such as the 
preponderance of the evidence standard.  Such an approach requires actual 
knowledge of the provision’s meaning so the Court can determine whether it is 
“more likely than not” that the provision has been violated.  See generally Tellabs, Inc. 
v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 329 (2007).  Where the Court applies a 
presumption—whether deferential or anti-deferential—it can decide cases without 
actual knowledge of the provision’s meaning. 
 220. Supra Part III.A. 
 221. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983) (allowing courts to use their own 
discretion in evaluating the different factors that need to be considered for 
proportionality). 
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punishments, declaring that reviewing courts should give “substantial 
deference” to the authority of the legislature and the trial court to 
determine appropriate sentences.222  Under this standard, reviewing 
courts should not substitute their own judgment for that of the 
legislature or trial court, but should simply determine whether a 
given punishment was “within constitutional limits.”223  By using 
moral judgment in conjunction with analysis of current punishment 
practices throughout the country, a reviewing court could determine 
whether a given punishment was unconstitutionally harsh in light of 
the defendant’s moral culpability. 
When the pluralities in Harmelin and Ewing abandoned the 
Supreme Court’s traditional definition of “excessive,” they also 
changed the implementation rules governing excessiveness claims.  
First, they replaced the “substantial deference” standard of review 
with the “rational basis” test, an implementation rule that imposes a 
strong presumption of constitutionality.224  Under the rational basis 
test, a statute will be upheld so long as it bears a conceivable rational 
relationship to a legitimate government interest.  Second, the 
pluralities transformed the Court’s independent judgment baseline, 
which involved comparison of the gravity of the offense to the 
harshness of the penalty, into a threshold test that would allow the 
Court to dismiss excessiveness claims without asking whether the 
punishment at issue violates a current societal moral consensus.225  
Third, by holding that the legislature could use punishment to 
pursue any governmental interest it chose, the pluralities 
transformed the question of a crime’s “gravity” into a purely 
legislative decision.226  In measuring the gravity of a crime against the 
harshness of a punishment, the pluralities indicated that the Court 
should examine how serious the legislature considered the crime to 
be, not how serious the crime actually is.227 
                                                          
 222. Id. at 290. 
 223. Id. at 290 n.16. 
 224. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 27–28 (2003) (plurality opinion) 
(providing that questions about the fit between the punishment and the crime are 
“appropriately directed at the legislature,” not the Court); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 
U.S. 957, 1003–04 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (upholding mandatory life sentence for narcotics offender with no prior 
record because there was a “rational basis” for the sentence). 
 225. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment) (“[I]ntrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional analyses are appropriate only 
in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the 
sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.”). 
 226. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28–30 (plurality opinion). 
 227. See id. at 27–28 (holding that it is the legislature’s prerogative to decide 
whether a crime is sufficiently serious to justify a given punishment). 
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After Harmelin and Ewing, the constitutional prohibition of 
excessive punishments appeared to be meaningless.228  If it is solely 
the legislature’s prerogative to decide what interests to pursue 
through criminal punishment and which crimes are serious in light 
of these interests, there would seem to be no situation in which a 
court could find a legislatively authorized punishment 
unconstitutionally excessive—particularly given the Court’s “rational 
basis” standard of review.  In other words, the implementation rules 
applied in these cases amounted to a strong categorical presumption 
that legislatively authorized sentences of imprisonment are 
constitutional.  Under these rules, the Supreme Court upheld a 
mandatory life sentence for a first-time drug offender,229 a mandatory 
sentence of twenty-five years to life for a recidivist who shoplifted 
three golf clubs,230 and a mandatory sentence of fifty years to life for a 
recidivist who twice shoplifted videotapes.231  Lower courts have 
upheld mandatory sentences of twenty-five years to life for recidivists 
who commit crimes as minor as stealing a slice of pizza.232 
2. The presumption of unconstitutionality 
And yet, in cases involving what the Court now calls “categorical”233 
challenges to excessive punishments, the Supreme Court has struck 
down certain punishments as excessive under the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause.  A categorical challenge arises from the claim 
that a given punishment is Cruel and Unusual with respect to an 
entire category of offense or offender.234  Between 2002 and 2008, 
the Court held that it is categorically unconstitutional to impose 
the death penalty on the mentally disabled,235 on persons who were 
minors at the time they committed the offense,236 and on anyone 
                                                          
 228. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 83 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(asserting that if the fifty years to life sentence imposed in this companion case to 
Ewing “is not grossly disproportionate, the principle has no meaning”). 
 229. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 997; see id. at 961 (plurality opinion). 
 230. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30–31 (plurality opinion). 
 231. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 66, 77. 
 232. See Jack Leonard, ‘Pizza Thief’ Walks the Line, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2010), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/10/local/la-me-pizzathief10-2010feb10 
(describing the use of California’s Three Strikes law against a recidivist convicted of 
stealing a slice of pizza). 
 233. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010). 
 234. Id. (describing the Court’s prior use of categorical rules in death penalty 
cases, and applying such rules in a case involving life sentences with no possibility of 
parole for juvenile offenders). 
 235. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
 236. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570–71 (2005). 
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convicted of a non-homicide offense against an individual.237  In 
2010, the Court invalidated all life sentences with no possibility of 
parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders,238 and in 2012, it 
banned mandatory life sentences with no possibility of parole for 
all juvenile offenders.239 
The Supreme Court has accomplished these results in categorical 
cases by employing a slightly different interpretive strategy and a 
vastly different set of implementation rules than it has in cases 
involving adult sentences of imprisonment. 
In categorical cases, the Supreme Court’s interpretive strategy is 
similar to the strategy employed in Miranda:  the Court flirts with 
various definitions of “excessive” without ultimately choosing any of 
them.  In some cases, the Court implies that excessiveness should be 
measured in relation to retributive or deterrent goals.240  In other 
cases, the Court adds rehabilitation to the mix.241  In still others, 
incapacitation is included as a possible justification for 
punishment.242  This approach differs to some degree from the 
Court’s approach in “non-categorical” cases.  In the non-categorical 
cases, the Court implies that legislatures are free to use punishment 
to further any legitimate goal.243  In the categorical cases, the Court 
seems to limit the legislature to some or all of the four current 
mainstream theories of punishment.244 
                                                          
 237. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 447, modified on denial of reh’g, 554 U.S. 
945 (2008). 
 238. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030. 
 239. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012). 
 240. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (plurality opinion) 
(determining that the death penalty is an excessive punishment for rape because 
rapists are not as culpable as murderers); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) 
(plurality opinion) (“The death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes:  
retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.”). 
 241. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420 (“[P]unishment is justified under one or 
more of three principal rationales:  rehabilitation, deterrence, and retribution.”). 
 242. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028 (“With respect to life without parole for 
juvenile nonhomicide offenders, none of the goals of penal sanctions that have been 
recognized as legitimate—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation—provides an adequate justification.” (citation omitted)). 
 243. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (plurality opinion) 
(“Selecting the sentencing rationales is generally a policy choice to be made by state 
legislatures, not federal courts.”).  The idea that legislatures are totally free to choose 
the justification for punishment comports with the Court’s acceptance of so-called 
“regulatory” offenses, where the legislature creates strict liability crimes to further 
non-penal goals such as public health.  Such crimes impose criminal punishment 
without requiring any proof of moral culpability.  See generally John F. Stinneford, 
Punishment Without Culpability, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 659–72 (2012) 
(critiquing the use of strict liability criminal statutes). 
 244. See generally Stinneford, supra note 243, at 720 (providing that the four 
theories are “retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation”). 
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Although the various definitions of “excessive” presented in the 
categorical cases are more limiting than the total non-definition 
presented in Harmelin and Ewing, they are not much more limiting.  
Just as it is difficult to tell whether a statement is compelled when 
“compelled” might mean involuntary or the result of improper police 
pressure or the result of custodial interrogation,245 it is difficult to tell 
whether a punishment is excessive when “excessive” might mean 
harsher than justified by the goal of retribution or deterrence or 
rehabilitation or incapacitation.  The more “ors” added to the 
definition, the more the definition descends into meaninglessness.246 
In its categorical cases, as in its non-categorical cases, the Supreme 
Court has made up for its interpretive failure through 
implementation rules.  But the rules employed in the categorical 
cases are quite different than those used in the adult imprisonment 
cases.  The rules include most prominently a set of parameters that 
defines which types of cases will get categorical treatment and which 
will not, as well as a strong presumption of unconstitutionality for 
punishments that fall within these parameters. 
The Supreme Court uses three main criteria for determining 
whether a given case qualifies for categorical treatment:  the nature 
of the offense, the characteristics of the offender, and the type of 
punishment.247  The most significant of these is the type of 
                                                          
 245. See supra Part II.B. 
 246. The Court’s willingness to allow the legislatures to rely on any of these 
theories as justification for a given punishment makes “excessiveness” meaningless 
because these theories embody fundamentally different conceptions of what is 
excessive.  Retributive theory concerns the relationship between the punishment and 
the offender’s moral culpability or desert.  See Frase, supra note 218, at 73.  
Deterrence theory focuses on the relationship between the cost imposed by the 
punishment and the cost it saves by deterring others from committing a particular 
crime.  See Frase, supra note 170, at 593–94.  Incapacitation theory compares the cost 
of punishment to the harm prevented by depriving the specific offender of the 
opportunity to commit a future crime.  See id. at 594. Finally, proponents of 
rehabilitation theory argue that punishment is justified to the extent that it reduces 
the risk that the individual will reoffend once released.  See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, 
The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment:  A Retrospective on the Past Century and 
Some Thoughts about the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2003).  It is hard to imagine a 
punishment that could not plausibly be characterized as proportionate under one of 
these theories, even if it would be excessive under other theories.  For example, in 
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25–27 (plurality opinion), a plurality of the Supreme Court 
seemingly had no trouble upholding a sentence of twenty-five years to life for a 
small-time recidivist convicted of shoplifting three golf clubs on the ground that 
it furthered the state’s interest in deterrence and incapacitation, despite the fact 
that the punishment appeared wildly excessive in light of Ewing’s moral 
culpability for shoplifting. 
 247. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022, 2030 (“The previous cases in this classification 
involved the death penalty.  The classification in turn consists of two subsets, one 
considering the nature of the offense, the other considering the characteristics of the 
offender. . . .  This Court now holds that for a juvenile offender who did not commit 
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punishment.  To date, no case has been given categorical treatment 
that does not involve the death penalty or life imprisonment with no 
possibility of parole.  When a case involves one of these two penalties, 
the Court will give it categorical treatment if it also involves certain 
vulnerable classes of defendant (e.g., juveniles and the mentally 
disabled) or an offense less serious than homicide. 
If a case fits within these criteria, the Supreme Court employs a 
strong presumption of unconstitutionality.  For example, in Graham 
v. Florida,248 the defendant committed several armed robberies 
between the ages of sixteen and seventeen, the last of which occurred 
when he was one month shy of his eighteenth birthday.249  After 
Graham’s final offense, the trial court that had granted him 
probation for his first robbery revoked the probation and sentenced 
him to life imprisonment with no possibility of parole.250  The trial 
court based this decision on its conclusion that Graham was 
incorrigible and that life imprisonment was necessary to protect 
the community.251 
The Supreme Court invalidated this sentence and held that it is per 
se unconstitutional to impose a life sentence for a non-homicide 
offense committed as a juvenile unless there is “some meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and 
rehabilitation.”252  The Court reached this conclusion by employing 
the “evolving standards of decency” and “independent judgment” 
baselines in a strongly anti-deferential manner.253 
Regarding evolving standards of decency, the Graham Court 
concluded that there was a societal consensus against the punishment 
of life without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders despite the 
fact that it was authorized by the federal government, thirty-seven 
states, and the District of Columbia.254  The Court’s rationale for this 
conclusion was that the punishment was rarely imposed and that 
imposition was concentrated in a relatively small number of states.255  
This analysis contrasted sharply with the Court’s previous “evolving 
                                                          
homicide the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole.”); see 
also Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466 (2012) (“In part because we viewed [life 
sentences without possibility of parole] for juveniles as akin to the death penalty, we 
treated it similarly to that most severe punishment.  We imposed a categorical ban on 
the sentence’s use, in a way unprecedented for a term of imprisonment.”). 
 248. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 249. Id. at 2019. 
 250. Id. at 2020. 
 251. Id. at 2019–20. 
 252. Id. at 2030. 
 253. See id. at 2045. 
 254. Id. at 2023, 2026. 
 255. Id. at 2023–26. 
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standards” analysis, under which the Court held that rarity of 
imposition was not sufficient to demonstrate a societal consensus 
against a given punishment because rarity might simply indicate that 
judges and juries believed the punishment should be reserved for the 
worst cases.256  Put differently, the Graham Court’s “evolving 
standards” analysis involved a presumption of unconstitutionality.  
Given epistemic uncertainty arising from conflicting facts—the 
punishment was authorized in a super-majority of states, but was 
rarely imposed—the Supreme Court chose to let the risk of error fall 
against a finding of constitutionality.257 
The Graham Court also concluded that the punishment was 
excessive under the independent judgment baseline.258  The Court 
analyzed whether the punishment was justified under any of the four 
current mainstream theories of punishment, and once again it 
employed a presumption of unconstitutionality.259  The Court first 
held that retribution was not an adequate justification for 
punishment because of epistemic uncertainty regarding the 
culpability of juvenile offenders.260  Even “expert psychologists” have 
difficulty differentiating between juvenile offenders whose conduct 
reflects “transient immaturity” and those “whose crime reflects 
irreparable corruption.”261 Therefore, juveniles “cannot with 
reliability be classified among the worst offenders.”262  Deterrence was 
also not a sufficient justification because the “lack of maturity and 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility” observed in many juveniles 
“often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions,” 
thus making juveniles generally “less susceptible to deterrence” than 
                                                          
 256. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976) (plurality opinion) 
(“[T]he relative infrequency of jury verdicts imposing the death sentence does not 
indicate rejection of capital punishment per se.  Rather, the reluctance of juries in 
many cases to impose the sentence may well reflect the humane feeling that this most 
irrevocable of sanctions should be reserved for a small number of extreme cases.”). 
 257. The Supreme Court’s other categorical cases also show a presumption of 
unconstitutionality associated with the evolving standards of decency analysis.  See, 
e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 426, 433 (finding a societal consensus 
against the death penalty for non-homicide offenses despite a strong legislative trend 
in its favor), modified on denial of reh’g, 554 U.S. 945 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543 
U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005) (finding a societal consensus against the death penalty for 
minors despite approval of this punishment in a majority of death penalty states); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (finding a societal consensus against the 
death penalty for the mentally disabled, despite authorization of this punishment in 
a majority of death-penalty states). 
 258. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2039–40.  
 259. See id. at 2028. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 2026. 
 262. Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573). 
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average adults.263  Incapacitation also was not an adequate 
justification for life imprisonment with no possibility of parole 
because it is too difficult to determine at sentencing which juvenile 
offenders are truly incorrigible and which will grow out of their 
criminal conduct over time.264  Finally, the punishment could not be 
justified on rehabilitative grounds, since the assumption underlying 
the punishment was that the offender could not be rehabilitated.265 
The Supreme Court was only able to reach these conclusions by 
using a presumption against constitutionality.  Recall that in Rummel 
v. Estelle, the Supreme Court held that because penologists could not 
agree on the appropriate sentence for given crimes, the Court should 
defer to legislative judgment and apply a strong presumption of 
constitutionality.266  In categorical cases like Graham, the Court 
employs precisely the opposite presumption:  because the Court 
cannot reliably determine whether a juvenile is immature or 
corrupt, deterrable or undeterrable, a permanent danger to 
society or capable of growth and rehabilitation, the punishment is 
presumed unconstitutional. 
E. The Legacy of the Supreme Court’s “Categorical” Excessive      
Punishment Cases 
The Supreme Court’s categorical approach to excessive 
punishments is much more recent than Miranda, and thus its 
ultimate legacy is less clear.  Nonetheless, three consequences of the 
Court’s decision to use implementation rules as a substitute for 
interpretation are already coming into focus. 
First, as with the Miranda rules, it is impossible to tell whether the 
Supreme Court’s rules categorically prohibiting the death penalty or 
life without parole for certain classes of offenses or offenders over-
enforce, under-enforce, or perfectly enforce the meaning of the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of excessive punishments.267  
Because we do not know what “unusual” or “excessive” mean, we 
cannot tell whether these implementation rules effectively minimize 
error costs. 
It is quite clear, however, that the Supreme Court’s categorical 
rules under-enforce the Constitution in one crucial respect:  they 
                                                          
 263. Id. at 2028 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 571; Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 
367 (1993)). 
 264. Id. at 2029. 
 265. Id. at 2029–30. 
 266. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 283–84 (1980); supra notes 192–194. 
 267. See generally supra Part II.A. 
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only cover the small class of cases involving the death penalty or 
juveniles given life sentences with no possibility of parole.  These 
cases constitute only one one-thousandth of one percent of all felony 
convictions.268  The vast majority of criminal offenders come within 
the strong categorical presumption of constitutionality announced in 
Harmelin and Ewing. 
Despite their narrow scope, the Supreme Court’s categorical rules 
have created an appearance of over-enforcement that has fueled 
political and legislative reaction.  The categorical presumption of 
unconstitutionality covers some of the most hotly contested political 
issues of the day—the death penalty,269 sex offenders,270 juvenile 
crime and punishment271—and has generated outrage and resistance 
by many governmental actors affected by these decisions.  After the 
Supreme Court invalidated mandatory life sentences for juvenile 
homicide offenders, for example, Iowa Governor Terry Branstad 
announced that such offenders in his state would be eligible for 
parole after sixty years.272  Similarly, Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal 
specifically cited the Supreme Court’s “atrocious ruling” invalidating 
the death penalty for non-homicide offenders as justification for 
signing a new law imposing chemical castration on sex offenders.273 
Because the Supreme Court’s categorical rules were adopted as a 
substitute for interpretation, the Court has few resources to deal with 
the resistance described above except through the formulation of 
more rules.  At what point will the Court experience “rules fatigue” 
and cease intervening when a state comes up with a new way to 
impose a very harsh punishment that complies with the formal terms 
of its existing rules?  If the experience of Miranda is any guide, such 
fatigue is not far off.  When it comes, the existing categorical rules 
will provide relatively little protection even for those they were meant 
to protect. 
                                                          
 268. See John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899, 902–03, & n.11 (2011) (noting the small 
number of cases that are actually affected by these rules).  
 269. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, modified on denial of reh’g, 554 
U.S. 945 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304 (2002). 
 270. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 446–47. 
 271. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. 
Ct. 2011 (2010); Roper, 543 U.S. 551. 
 272. See Branstad Commutes Life Sentences for 38 Iowa Juvenile Murderers, GAZETTE 
(July 16, 2012, 10:05 PM), http://thegazette.com/2012/07/16/branstad-commutes-
life-sentences-for-38-iowa-juvenile-murderers. 
 273. See Governor Signs Chemical Castration Bill, Authorizing the Castration of Sex Offenders in 
Louisiana, OFF. GOVERNOR (June 25, 2008), http://gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md 
=newsroom&tmp=detail&articleID=270.   
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Finally, the substitution of implementation rules for interpretation 
has left the Court with little capacity for determining whether a 
punishment imposed on a certain individual for a specific crime is 
excessive.  For example, in 2011, the Supreme Court held that 
juvenile homicide offenders have a right to individualized 
determinations that a life sentence without possibility of parole is 
appropriate.274  But as the Court previously noted in Graham v. 
Florida, it is extraordinarily difficult to determine whether a given 
juvenile is sufficiently depraved and dangerous to be considered 
incapable of rehabilitation and to require lifelong incapacitation.275  
Since the current approach to excessiveness requires courts to 
consider not only individual culpability but also speculative claims 
about deterrence, future dangerousness, and capacity for 
rehabilitation, it is highly unlikely that this effort at individualized 
determination will be successful.  Instead, the Court will almost 
certainly abandon the individualized sentencing requirement from 
Miller v. Alabama276 in favor of a categorical presumption of 
constitutionality or unconstitutionality.277 
F. Resolving the Dilemma Through Interpretation 
As the discussion above indicates, in recent decades, the Supreme 
Court has taken a bad situation and made it worse.  The Court began 
by partially failing to interpret the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause, then found itself unable to implement the Clause effectively, 
then withdrew the partial interpretation it had previously given the 
Clause, and finally constructed a set of implementation rules that are 
highly protective of a tiny class of offenders and completely 
unprotective of everyone else. 
This cascade of failures is the predictable, and even inevitable, 
result of the Supreme Court’s initial failure to interpret the word 
“unusual” in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.  As 
discussed above, it is virtually impossible to implement a bare 
prohibition of “cruel punishments.”278  Pain is the very point of 
punishment, and the line between justified and unjustified inflictions 
                                                          
 274. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467–68, 2474–75. 
 275. See id. at 2475 (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27, 2034). 
 276. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 277. The Supreme Court hinted at this likelihood in Miller itself.  See Miller, 132 S. 
Ct. at 2469 (“[G]iven all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision about 
children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think 
appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will 
be uncommon.”). 
 278. See supra Part III.B. 
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of pain can be very difficult to determine.  The evolving standards of 
decency baseline is fatally flawed, and the independent judgment 
baseline amounts to little more than the unconstrained exercise of 
judicial will.279  It is not surprising that the Supreme Court ultimately 
resorted to a system of categorical presumptions to resolve 
excessiveness claims under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause.  Nor is it surprising, given the Court’s general reluctance to 
interfere with legislative prerogative, that these presumptions are 
vastly underprotective. 
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of excessive punishments 
would have been much easier to implement had the Court started by 
interpreting the word “unusual.”280  In the context of the Eighth 
Amendment, the word “unusual” means “contrary to long usage.”281  
Under the common law ideology that underlays the Eighth 
Amendment, a governmental practice that enjoys long usage is 
considered presumptively just, whereas a governmental practice that 
is contrary to long usage—an “unusual” practice—is considered 
presumptively unjust.282  The fact that the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause focuses on punishments that are “cruel and new” 
implies that the core purpose of the Clause is to protect criminal 
offenders when the government’s desire to inflict pain has become 
unjustly enflamed, whether this desire is caused by political or racial 
animus or moral panic in the face of a perceived crisis.283  In these 
situations, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is supposed to 
serve as a check on the impulse to ratchet up punishments to a new 
degree of harshness.284 
A prohibition of punishments that are “cruel and new” is easier to 
implement than a bare prohibition of cruel punishments, and will 
extend the protection of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
to a far broader group of cases.  Recall Rummel and Helm:  the Helm 
Court took the position that courts could sort out questions of 
ordinal proportionality by looking at traditional culpability factors 
such as intent, harm, and offender’s character, and could use 
comparisons to current intrastate and interstate practice to decide 
                                                          
 279. See id.   
 280. See Stinneford, supra note 28, at 1770–71. 
 281. Id. at 1817. 
 282. See id. at 1815–17.  The broader relationship between the U.S. Constitution and 
the customary English Constitution has been explored by a number of scholars.  For a 
particularly provocative exploration of this relationship, see LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE 
THEMSELVES:  POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 9–34 (2004). 
 283. Stinneford, supra note 268, at 909, 969–70. 
 284. See id. 
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questions of cardinal proportionality.285  The Rummel Court, by 
contrast, argued that questions of ordinal and cardinal 
proportionality are inherently subjective, and that any effort to 
enforce a prohibition of excessive punishments would force state and 
federal punishment practices toward complete uniformity—a result 
that seems inconsistent with the premises of federalism.286 
The Rummel Court’s objections largely disappear once the focus 
shifts from “cruel punishments” to “cruel and new” punishments.  
With respect to ordinal proportionality, the question is not how 
culpable (relative to other offenders) the Court judges this offender 
to be, but rather how culpable (relative to other offenders) an 
offender like this has traditionally been judged.  With respect to 
cardinal proportionality, the question is not whether the punishment 
of this offender for this particular crime is harsher than the rest of 
society permits right now, but rather whether the punishment of this 
offender for this particular crime is harsher than society has 
permitted up to now. 
This approach avoids the total subjectivity associated with the 
“independent judgment” baseline because it asks the Court to 
compare the challenged punishment to prior practice rather than 
relying solely on the Court’s own moral and practical intuitions.  This 
approach also avoids the enforced uniformity implied by Helm’s 
interstate and intrastate analysis.  Because prior practice involves a 
range of permissible punishments, any punishment that falls within 
that range would not be considered excessive.287  But if the 
punishment is new, unprecedented, or outside the range permitted 
by prior practice, it may fairly be characterized as unusual.288  If the 
punishment is harsher than prior practice would permit, it is cruel 
and unusual.289 
Finally, the focus on “cruel and new” punishments would not 
require the Court to approve long-dead punishment practices that 
were once part of our tradition, such as flogging and mutilation.  
Under the common law ideology that formed the basis for the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, practices that fall out of 
usage for a significant period of time lose their place in the 
tradition and become “unusual.”290  If a legislature seeks to 
                                                          
 285. See supra Part III.B. 
 286. See supra Part III.B. 
 287. Stinneford, supra note 268, at 972. 
 288. See id. 
 289. See id. 
 290. See, e.g., James v. Commonwealth, 12 Serg. & Rawle 220, 228 (Pa. 1825) (“The 
long disuetude of any law amounts to its repeal.”); EDWARD COKE, THE COMPLEAT 
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reintroduce them, they will be treated with the same skepticism as 
any other “new” punishment.291 
The insight provided by interpretation of the word “unusual” is 
important because we live in a world of “unusual” punishments.  We 
have experienced crime panic after crime panic during the past forty 
years,292 and as a result, we treat drug offenders,293 sex offenders,294 
juvenile offenders,295 and recidivists296 (to name a few) with a degree 
of harshness unprecedented in recent history.  For example, several 
states currently impose a form of castration on sex offenders, a 
punishment that was eliminated from the common law tradition in 
the thirteenth century.297 
A focus on “cruel and new” punishments would support the 
Supreme Court’s decision to limit both the death penalty and harsh 
sentences for juvenile offenders.298  Such a focus would also permit 
the Court to engage in robust review of terms of imprisonment,299 
thus protecting the vast majority of offenders who are currently 
unprotected by the Eighth Amendment.300 
CONCLUSION 
The substitution of implementation rules for interpretation has 
several pernicious effects on constitutional adjudication.  Because 
such rules are not based on interpretation of the Constitution, they 
                                                          
COPYHOLDER § 33 (1630) (“Custome . . . lose[s its] being, if usage faile.”), reprinted in 
2 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 563, 564 (Steve 
Sheppard ed., 2003); Stinneford, supra note 28, at 1813. 
 291. See Stinneford, supra note 28, at 1817. 
 292. Stinneford, supra note 268, at 970; see also Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence 
Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 807 (2003) ([A] moral panic [is a 
situation] in which media, politicians, and the public reinforce each other in an 
escalating pattern of alarmed reaction to a perceived social threat.  The elements of a 
moral panic include an intense community concern (often triggered by a 
publicized incident) that is focused on deviant behavior, an exaggerated 
perception of the seriousness of the threat and the number of offenders, and 
collective hostility toward the offenders, who are perceived as outsiders 
threatening the community.” (footnote omitted)). 
 293. See Michael M. O’Hear, Perpetual Panic, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 69, 73 (2008). 
 294. See id. at 69; see also John F. Stinneford, Incapacitation Through Maiming:  
Chemical Castration, the Eighth Amendment, and the Denial of Human Dignity, 3 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 559, 561 (2006) (describing the recent trend toward imposing 
chemical castration as a punishment for sex offenders). 
 295. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 292, at 807–11 (describing contemporary 
juvenile justice policy as the product of a moral panic). 
 296. Stinneford, supra note 268, at 923–24, 975–76 (describing the unprecedented 
nature of the punishments upheld by the Supreme Court in Harmelin and Ewing). 
 297. Stinneford, supra note 294, at 563, 595. 
 298. Stinneford, supra note 268, at 973–77. 
 299. See id. at 973–78. 
 300. See generally id. at 903–10. 
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create an appearance of judicial legislation.  This appearance often 
provokes political and legislative backlash, resulting in judicial 
adoption of implementation rules that are largely underprotective.  
The Supreme Court’s current Eighth Amendment excessiveness 
cases are a perfect example of this phenomenon:  the Court has 
replaced interpretation with implementation rules that 
overprotect one one-thousandth of one percent of all felony 
offenders and vastly underprotect the rest.  The best way to right 
this imbalance is to return to the traditional judicial practice of 
interpretation prior to implementation. 
